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The subject matter I treat here is well-trodden ground. Thousands of historians, artists, 
and critics have endeavored to explain or describe the replacement of modernism by 
postmodernism in the Western world with varied results. It is true that there are few topics as 
broad and nebulous as this, but it is also true that there are few which are as consequential, 
especially from the position in which we find ourselves today, when all historical metanarratives 
are immediately suspect and few remain unscathed by the forces of deconstruction, parody, and 
irony. In 1874, Friedrich Nietzsche lamented that “we are all suffering from a consuming fever 
of history.”1 If only he could have witnessed the overwhelming historical consciousness of 
today’s world! 
In light of both the broadness and the relevance of this topic, my intention is not to deny 
or disprove the other accounts of the transformation which I describe but rather to complement 
them by narrativizing the events and ideas with which I engage from a new perspective. My 
approach to intellectual history is genealogical, in that it traces novel ideas to the intellectual 
environments from which they originate, but I complicate these chains of intellectual 
transmission by tethering them to a separate but always present parallel history of class conflict 
and development. In short, the narrative I present is guided by a Marxian analysis of aesthetic 
transformation. 
Why do I choose to engage with the ideological conceits of Marxism in a discussion of 
aesthetics? The most important reason is that Marxism was the language used by the generation 
which came of age in the West before, during, and immediately after the Second World War to 
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 57–124, 60. 
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describe the ideological and aesthetic struggles which they participated in. Clement Greenberg 
and Jean-Paul Sartre, to name just a few, could not help but evaluate the world around them in 
light of capital’s exploitation of the proletariat, even if their political allegiances did not always 
follow the party line. Choosing to ignore the prevalence of Marxian thinking—if not Marxism 
outright—among Western intelligentsia in the mid-20th century would fail to convey the 
ramifications of modernism’s predicament. 
Presenting history through a Marxian lens means that I am situating myself within a very 
specific tradition with a distinctive set of practices and—more crucially—ideologically-
dependent assumptions. I am not entering in on this exploration from the ground floor. Instead, I 
stand on the shoulders of Karl Marx and those inspired by him, including Jean Baudrillard and 
Fredric Jameson. I consult their texts both as primary sources and as frameworks which guide 
my thinking. 
This is not to say that I am willing to merely accept Marxism as true. It is important to 
remember that, although any discussion of “primitivity” must necessarily tackle the fraught 
relationship between center (Europe) and periphery (the rest of the world), the thinkers I engage 
with are almost exclusively situated in the center looking outwards. Whether or not Marxian 
thought accurately describes the processes of class development and reconfiguration that took 
place in the Global South is a question for another paper—what matters here is that many 
Westerners did believe this was the case, and that this belief shaped how they saw themselves 




What is modernism? 
In his 1931 introduction to Le Corbusier’s Towards a New Architecture, Frederick 
Etchells hypothesizes that “A man of the eighteenth century, plunged suddenly into our 
civilization, might well have the impression of something akin to a nightmare.”2 Le Corbusier 
(1887-1965), born Charles-Édouard Jeanneret, was a Swiss-French architect and aesthetic 
theorist who first articulated some of modernist architecture’s most important ideas, most of 
which revolved around the idea that “Our own epoch is determining, day by day, its own style.”3 
His vision for the cities of the future, therefore, involves the replacement of anything traditional 
or colloquial with the conspicuously modern. He redefines a house as a “machine for living in” 
and an armchair as a “machine for sitting in.”4 Etchells’s statement appears, at first glance, to 
criticize Le Corbusier’s manifesto, which proudly proclaims that “things have changed: and 
changed for the better.”5 Common sense leads us to agree with Etchells. What would the average 
denizen of the eighteenth century think, plucked from the relative humility of preindustrial 
civilization and placed in the modern age, when gleaming towers as large as mountains and 
vehicles faster than most birds are commonplace? Should this feeling of unease with the world 
modernity has created lead us to become Luddites, or at least reactionaries? No, Etchells 
answers, “We need not be unduly alarmed.”6 The world has changed, undoubtedly, but the 
 
2 Frederick Etchells, “Introduction,” in Towards A New Architecture, Dover Books on Architecture (New York: Dover 
Publications, 2013), v. 
3 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, trans. Etchells, Frederick, Dover Books on Architecture (New York: 
Dover Publications, 2013), 3. 
4 Le Corbusier, 95. 
5 Le Corbusier, 272. 
6 Etchells, “Introduction,” v. 
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modern person “seems happy or unhappy to much the same degree before…He learns to admit 
and even, in a sneaking sort of way, to like new and strange forms.”7 
Etchells’s statement expresses an important nuance within modernism itself. From the 
perspective of visual arts, modernism holds the curious position of being an aesthetic movement 
with philosophical aims. Ezra Pound famously declared “Make it new!”8 and in doing so 
accepted the challenge of contradicting the values of classical beauty and common taste. Why? 
Modernism is a theoretically heterogenous movement, but at the foundation of every tendency 
lies a progressive historicism—that is, a sense that history is headed somewhere. In its present 
formulation, modernism’s teleological sense of history can be traced to German idealists such as 
Hegel, who posited that “History is the process whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own 
concept.”9 The end of such a vision of history “is that the spirit should attain knowledge of its 
own true nature, that it should objectivise this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and 
give itself an objective existence”10 leading to the resolution of humanity’s internecine struggles. 
Being an idealist, Hegel locates his dialectic within the realm of pure thought. His contribution to 
modernism was attached quite tenuously, therefore, to the economic, social, and environmental 
upheaval that had already begun to revolutionize Western life in the early 19th century. 
Hegel’s philosophy of history spawned a whole field of scholars who critiqued, reapplied, 
and politicized his work. Among these was Ludwig Feuerbach, whose book The Essence of 
Christianity enlisted the dialectical idea to describe religion as an anthropological, material 
phenomenon.11 In 1844, the young Karl Marx composed a manuscript commending Feuerbach’s 
 
7 Etchells, v-vi. 
8 Ezra Pound, Make It New (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935). 
9 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 62. 
10 Hegel, 64. 
11 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 171. 
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materialism for making “the social relationship of ‘man to man’ the basic principle of the 
theory.”12 Instead of locating historical change within the venue of pure thought, Marx argued 
that individuals’ relationship with property and the class dynamics which govern it constitute 
more coherent determinants of history. “Communism,” he argued, was “the positive 
transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real 
appropriation of the human essence by and for man…Communism is the riddle of history 
solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.”13 Marx applied Hegel’s framework to the rapid 
modernizing changes he observed in the world around him, ushering in a modernism tied to 
technological progress. While the implications of Hegel and Marx’s approaches differed 
greatly—i.e. metaphysical versus political revolution—both agree that progress entails self-
discovery, a return to a more essential humanity. 
Modernism, therefore, views historical progress as possessing an epistemological 
function. “Progress,” though vague and wide open to interpretation, informs our expectations for 
both the future and our own self-conceptions. Modernism turns history in on itself, reflecting 
upon and participating in the historical changes which will fulfill modernists’ prognostications 
for the future. As American historian Priya Satia asserts in her book Time’s Monster, “An 
important part of what makes modern historical activity ‘modern’ is that modern historical actors 
consciously seek change that they understand as ‘historical.’”14 A consequence of this attitude is 
that modernism can even be at odds with modernity or modernization if these more material—
and thus (hypothetically) more objective—states and processes behave unpredictably. 
 
 
12 Marx, 172. 
13 Marx, 135. 
14 Priya Satia, Time’s Monster: How History Makes History (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2020), 51. 
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What is postmodernism? 
Self-reflection, therefore, is a key attribute of modernism. Nevertheless, a certain type of 
“reflexive” art—works which react to themselves, make use of irony, or acknowledge the 
historical narratives in which they are involved—has with greater frequency over the past half 
century been recognized as “postmodern.” This term is framed in contrast with modernism, 
despite the obvious continuities between the concepts. In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson (1934-) posits an understanding of the term which is 
grounded more in historical context than substantive difference—“Modernism…thought 
compulsively about the New and tried to watch its coming into being…but the postmodern looks 
for breaks, for events rather than new worlds,…for the ‘When-it-all-changed.’”15 Modernism 
values history for its ability to bring out real change—the postmodern values history as such. 
Every event that occurs in the postmodern era is self-conscious of its historical meaning—it 
simulates the gravitas of “real” events. 
In his essay The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Jean Baudrillard (1927-2007) contrasts 
the earnestness of the Second World War with the protracted “non-war”16 that constituted the 
first conflict between the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The Second World War 
represented extreme suffering for the sake of concrete political aims and ultimately far-reaching 
social transformation. The Gulf War was framed in similar terms (i.e. civilizational clash, 
“freedom”) but in fact changed very little for almost all of us who are not Kuwaitis. What, then, 
did occur? As Baudrillard explains, “The media promote the war, the war promotes the media, 
 
15 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991), ix. 
16 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. Paul Patton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995), 24. 
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and advertising competes with the war.”17 During the postmodern era, the mere consciousness of 
“being at war” as a heavy and exciting historical event becomes more palpable than the war 
itself. Postmodernism, therefore, is unconcerned with the “true meaning” of things. It does not 
deny reality, it merely adopts an agnostic attitude towards it. 
As the Gulf War demonstrates, the representation of history can be effectively used to 
sublimate what Jameson calls “the Utopian impulse,”18—that is, the desire to effect actual 
political transformation. Since “Utopian representations knew an extraordinary revival in the 
1960s,” Jameson suggests that “postmodernism is the substitute for the sixties and the 
compensation for their political failure.”19 Demand for the signifiers of Utopia, however, has 
existed since the birth of modernism, most evidently in Marxian thought. The whole emphasis on 
dialectical materialism creates a historical framework which demands embodiment.  
How does one reconcile the fact of modernism and postmodernism being substantially 
different with the knowledge that neither can be cleanly periodized? Modernism, in conceiving 
of history as a cohesive, progressive narrative, necessarily concedes some ground to self-
consciousness, and therefore irony, reaction, and all the other characteristics which would later 
be bundled into the concept of “postmodernism.” Modernism and postmodernism are therefore 
engaged in a dialectic relationship with one another. The question, therefore, should not be “Why 
did postmodernism supersede modernism?” but rather “How did modernism necessarily define 
postmodernism, and bring it into dominance?” Rather than emphasizing the postmodern break, 
therefore, I will recontextualize the development of postmodernism as a logical “next step” with 
 
17 Baudrillard, 31. 
18 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, xvi. 
19 Jameson, xvi. 
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continuities that reach far back into the decades during which modernism was supposedly at its 
height. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE POSTWAR AVANT-GARDES 
Whatever those continuities may be, it is clear that modernism was rife with 
contradictions. Even when viewed as an aesthetic movement, one finds that modernism was 
preoccupied with questions seemingly beyond the pale of aesthetic beauty. Tasked with ushering 
in a new age, theoreticians of modernist aesthetics approached art and literature with a fervor 
usually associated with revolutionaries and ideologues. This is not to say that their endeavor 
sought to overcome “mere” taste. On the contrary, many sought to discover or imbue morality in 
taste. Modernism in aesthetics became increasingly ideological—a state of affairs which only 
intensified in the wake of the First World War. 
Admittedly, there was good reason to critically evaluate aesthetics through a political 
lens. Social and political upheavals had transformed the role and form of aesthetics in Western 
civilization over the course of the long 19th century. Thanks to the rise of the bourgeoisie both 
economically and politically across Europe, “high” art had gradually extricated itself from the 
aristocratic patronage networks to which it had hitherto been confined. Newly erected opera 
houses and museums therefore replaced churches and cathedrals as the focus of civic life in the 
decidedly “post-Nietzschean culture”20 of the fin de siècle. Aesthetic achievement came to be 
seen as the ultimate marker of nationhood and social status. Ismail Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, 
for instance, considered aesthetic achievement so indispensable to his country’s legitimacy on 
 
20 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siécle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), xix. 
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the international stage that he commissioned Giuseppe Verdi’s Aida21 just to have an excuse to 
invite the continent’s élite to his new Italian opera house in Cairo. 
The transition from aristocratic to bourgeois dominance in the aesthetic sphere was made 
a fait accompli by the tumultuous aftermath of the First World War. The Tsar and the Kaiser 
were ousted, communist revolutions sprung up in Russia, Germany, and Hungary, and the once-
opulent Austrian Empire found itself splintering into several successor states. The intertwined 
destinies of politics and aesthetics were reflected in both of the main ideologies which fed on the 
destruction of 19th century Europe: communism and fascism. In his 1935 essay “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), the German-Jewish 
philosopher whose writings laid the foundations for “political aesthetics” as a field, contends that 
the appeal of fascism lay in its ability to simulate popular power without upsetting society’s class 
structure—“This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism 
responds by politicizing art.” The political aesthetics of the interwar era were therefore mirror 
images. Both directed their attention towards mass culture and used it to underpin their 
conceptions of politics. 
 
Socialist realism 
Despite its sheer geographic extent, Europe’s revolutionary wave largely subsided within five 
years of armistice. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were put to death in Germany, while 
red Hungary fell victim to “white terror.”22 The only country where communist militancy 
managed to succeed beyond the immediate aftermath of the First World War was the fledgling 
 
21 Hans Busch and Giuseppe Verdi, Verdi’s Aida: The History of an Opera in Letters and Documents (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1978), liv. 
22 Bela Bodo, “The White Terror in Hungary, 1919-1921: The Social Worlds of Paramilitary Groups,” Austrian 
History Yearbook 42 (2011): 133+. 
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Soviet Union, turning the rump state into an international pariah. The Bolsheviks’ exceptional 
victory, however, provided a unique vehicle for the modernist movement in interwar Europe. 
Avant-garde movements—including Kazimir Malevich and El Lissitzky’s Suprematism as well 
as the experimental filmography of Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov—experienced a brief but 
spectacular blossoming in the wake of the Russian Revolution. The flourishing of art during this 
period was no coincidence, as many artists “actively participated in the Soviet project, directly 
engaging with Bolshevism to realize their own creative visions of aesthetic and social 
transformation under the aegis of state patronage.”23 For the revolutionary generation, 
modernism was closely linked with the mass politics of the time. Political change meant an 
opportunity for aesthetic transformation that pushed the boundaries of art. Take, for example, 
Vladimir Tatlin’s proposed Monument to the Third International: a ziggurat-shaped tangle of 
steel that would have towered over St. Petersburg. (Fig. 1.)24 Bold modernism was seen as a 
service to the people. The first years of the Soviet period loom large in the Western imagination 
as an era of highly fruitful aesthetic production, a view which is compounded by the supposed 
barrenness of the era which immediately followed it: the era of “socialist realism.”  
The supposed reasons for the development of socialist realism as the young country’s 
official aesthetic stance are varied, including the unfavorable juxtaposition of the 
“incomprehensible gibberish”25 produced by the avant-gardes (such as Taltin’s monument) with 
the severe economic devastation resulting from almost a decade of total war as well as the desire 
to craft a new non-bourgeois aesthetic that would confirm the Marxist idea that culture is 
 
23 Pamela Kachurin, Making Modernism Soviet: The Russian Avant-Garde in the Early Soviet Era, 1918-1928 
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2013), xvii. 
24 Yelena Lapshine and Vladimir Tatlin, Drawing of the Reconstructed Model of the Monument to the Third 
International, Orthogonal Projection, “West Facade,” ink on paper, 1993, Artstor. 
25 C. Vaughan James, Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 39. 
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fundamentally downstream of material circumstances. The basic tenets of socialist realism, as 
articulated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were narodnost’, klassovost’, and 
partiinost’, which can roughly be translated as “people-ness,” “class-ness,” and “party-ness,” 
respectively.26 While klassovost’ and partiinost’ involve a work of art’s adherence to the Party 
and its ideological line, the concept of narodnost’ had theoretical implications that transcended 
the particularities of the Soviet state. “In very primitive societies,” it was asserted, “art had a 
genuinely ‘popular’ (narodny) character. But the rise of capitalism and consequent development 
of its distinct class system led to a rift between spiritual and physical activities and hence 
between the masses and art.”27 With regards to aesthetics, this translates to a leveraging of art for 
status or money rather than personal enjoyment, a phenomenon which the Soviet line alleged 
resulted in the separation of “high” and “popular” art. 
For the theoreticians of socialist realism, therefore, the solution to the excesses of the 
bourgeois aesthetic was to look towards the marginalized folk traditions of the past. This is not to 
say socialist realism was a reactionary or anti-modern ethos. On the contrary, sources on Soviet 
aesthetic policy are clear that “works become ‘popular’ only when the social and aesthetic ideals 
upon which they rest are expressions of the most progressive tendencies of the times.”28 
Modernism—if one defines it as the valuation of progression in aesthetics—therefore remained 
the prevailing intellectual current in Soviet criticism, despite the ostensibly dramatic shift in both 
the content and style of officially condoned art and literature. To bridge this gap, Soviet 
theoreticians drew upon the Marxist conception of historical change, that is, the dialectical idea 
that class antagonism would inexorably lead to the victory of the proletarian class and therefore 
 
26 James, 1. 
27 James, 4. 
28 James, 3. 
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socialism, which they believed built upon and resolved the contradictions inherent within the 
social systems which preceded it. “The most progressive tendencies” were defined along class 
lines as opposed to actual aesthetic innovation. Given Marxism-Leninism’s strong materialism, it 
only made sense for the communist theoreticians of the 1930s to apply its framework of 
economic change to the realm of aesthetic philosophy. 
The incorporation of dialectic materialism into aesthetics found a powerful advocate in 
György Lukács (1885-1971), a philosopher and critic who served in Hungary’s brief communist 
government in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.29 He had a famously erratic 
relationship with Moscow, especially during the Stalin years, including participation in 
Hungary’s 1956 uprising. His writings later made him a Western Marxist darling. Nevertheless, 
Lukács embodies the ethos of socialist realism in his essay “Realism in the Balance,” which 
argues that “the objective social context and the ‘insistence on all-round knowledge’”30 are 
essential to good literature because they are necessary to counteract “the experience of 
disintegration”31 which capitalism perpetrates on the masses. Socialist realism, therefore, 
reminds the people of the ways in which the social and political intervene in—and even 
determine—the personal. The essential direction of history is revealed. By facetiously 
appropriating a quote from his interlocutor Ernst Bloch, who compares the “stream of 
consciousness” model of narrativization to “a mouth without Ego,”32 Lukács excoriates the 
boldly individualistic perspective of the surrealist or expressionist voice. 
 
29 Andy Blunden, ed., “Lukács, Georg (1885-1971),” in Marxists Internet Archive Encyclopedia (Marxists Internet 
Archive, n.d.), https://www.marxists.org/glossary/people/l/u.htm#lukacs-georg. 
30 György Lukács, “Realism in the Balance,” in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 
198p), 33. 
31 Lukács, 32. 
32 Lukács, 34. 
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The Soviet line had a powerful sway over the radical aesthetic in the West during the 
1940s, percolating though the avant-gardes by way of their often-radical politics. Benjamin’s 
belief that the response to fascism should be the politicization of art was shared widely among 
leftists (or at least anti-fascists) across the West. According to architectural critic Reyner 
Banham (1922-1988), the Architect’s Department of the London County Council was a notable 
stronghold of the “Anglo-Zhdanov line”33 since “the social conscience of the older architects in 
the Department had, in many cases, hardened into an acceptance of Communist doctrine.”34 The 
political slant of the Architect’s Department was enormously influential—it was the body 
empowered to oversee one of Europe’s most ambitious public rebuilding programs in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The ethos of British council housing in the immediate 
postwar therefore mirrored the ideals of socialist realism with additional influences from 
Swedish “New Humanistic” architecture35 and the exigencies of replenishing a housing stock 
depleted by the Blitz.36 In any case, the architectural establishment in England enthusiastically 
enculturated the Soviet idea of the ‘popular’ (narodny) aesthetic, borrowing from the sentimental 
flourishes of “Merry England” and resulting in an attitude which Banham described as “soft”37 
among the established architects of the Department. 
 
Hans Prinzhorn and ‘degenerate’ art 
While socialist realism was being constructed in the Soviet Union and among the left-
wing movements of the West, a similar marginalization (or reinterpretation) of the avant-gardes 
 
33 Andrei Zhdanov was the chief doctrinaire of Soviet cultural production in the immediate postwar era. 
34 Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism: Ethic or Aesthetic? (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1966), 11. 
35 John Boughton, Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing (London: Verso, 2018), 100. 
36 Boughton, 90. 
37 Banham, The New Brutalism: Ethic or Aesthetic?, 13. 
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was occurring in Germany. Ironically, this parallel development was due to the staggering 
ideological divergence between the two countries, a chasm which only widened as the Nazi Party 
consolidated power and began formulating its own aesthetic philosophy centered around an 
antimodern crusade against “degeneration” (Entartung).38 Modernism, according to Nazi critics 
of “degenerate art” (Entartete Kunst), was the reflection of poor mental health and a lack of 
“racial hygiene.”39 While the chief product of this stance was a series of art exhibitions featuring 
the works of Germany’s foremost modernist artists juxtaposed with the art of institutionalized 
mental patients and smug, mocking slogans like “Crazy at any price” and “Madness becomes 
method,”40 the connection between neurodivergence and modernism actually had deep roots in 
European aesthetic discourse, and not always in a negative sense. 
Hans Prinzhorn (1886-1933), for example, was an administrator at a psychiatric hospital 
in Heidelberg who collected thousands of works produced by mental patients from around 
continental Europe. The culmination of this project was a book, published in 1922, entitled 
“Artistry of The Mentally Ill” which identified “Ten Schizophrenic Masters” who created art 
that, in its compositional and conceptual creativity, could easily fit (in Prinzhorn’s view) within 
the newly minted modernist canon. Each case study features a brief biographical description of 
the artist followed by a formal analysis of a couple selected pieces. While Prinzhorn connects the 
individual elements that appear in the artists’ work to their illnesses or experiences, his analyses 
utilize the language of non-institutionalized artists, demonstrating a clear respect for the art 
 
38 Olaf Peters, “From Nordau to Hitler: ‘Degeneration’ and Anti-Modernism Between the Fin-De-Siècle and the 
National Socialist Takeover of Power,” in Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany 1937 (New 
York: Prestel, 2014), 17. 
39 Mario-Andreas von Lüttichau, “‘Crazy at Any Price’: The Pathologizing of Modernism in the Run-Up to the 
‘Entartete Kunst’ Exhibition in Munich in 1937,” in Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany 
1937 (New York: Prestel, 2014), 36-51. 
40 von Lüttichau, 36. 
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object apart from mere curiosity or clinical interest. According to Prinzhorn, the aesthetic value 
of these works should lead society to ask itself “What is schizophrenic about this picture?” the 
answer being, “We cannot be certain…Instead we have to make up our minds once and for all to 
count on a separate creative component and to look for the value of a work only within the work 
itself—even if it is that of a schizophrenic.”41 In this approach we may view the first inklings of 
late modern aesthetic criticism, including the essentialism of Clement Greenberg’s writings on 
painting. 
The other component of “degeneration” lay in the racial element of Nazi ideology, which 
believed that a root cause of modernism and its supposed degradation of Western culture was 
racial contamination, specifically through the presence of Jews in both high and popular culture. 
As Adolf Hitler declared at the 1934 Nuremburg Rally (famously featured in Leni Riefenstahl’s 
Triumph of the Will) “the works of those artists who are racially related in spirit [to the Aryan] 
must necessarily stand in closer proximity to his own and convey much more meaning for him 
than the artificial products of an alien infection that has spread amongst his Volk.”42 Similarly to 
neurodivergence, however, the link between xenophilia (or at least fetishism)—specifically 
towards those cultures that were viewed as more “primitive”—and modernism was also 
emphasized as a positive aspect of the new aesthetic by theoreticians during the interwar period. 
A prominent example of this was Ljubomir Micić’s (1895-1971) concept of 
“barbarogenius,” as articulated in his literary magazine Zenit. Micić was one of the first 
prominent avant-garde poets from the Balkan Peninsula, a region which was still reeling from its 
devastation during the First World War.43 While Micić’s explanations of the concept involved a 
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series of demands related to the perceived position of his native Yugoslavia on the margins of 
European civilization, including the recognition of the Balkans as the “sixth continent” and the 
“Balkanization of Europe,” the basic goal of “barbarogenius” was the creation of “a new 
symbolic figure of an artistic/creative genius invested with a pure barbarian force.”44 Micić not 
only self-consciously identified with the primitive outsider but also hailed him as the catalyst 
behind the modernist movement. Ironically, this stance was shared by the Nazis, albeit with 
completely opposite connotations. 
 
A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY OF MODERNISM 
Despite the defeat of Nazi Germany, the heyday of socialist realism-inspired “New 
Humanism” in the West faded almost as quickly as the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union. 
As Carl E. Schorske recalls in the introduction to Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, “In the decade after 
1947…a mood of pessimism—sometimes of impotence, sometimes of rigid defensiveness, 
sometimes of surrender—settled over an intelligentsia that, whether centrist or radical, liberal or 
Marxist, had for several decades been united in social optimism.”45 Among the Left, the 
philosophy of history that had justified the Soviet rejection of the avant-gardes no longer seemed 
tenable. No longer could it be trusted that the dialectic relationship between proletarian and 
bourgeois taste would result in an aesthetic which is both popular and “good.” Unlike the First 
World War, the Second involved loftier ideals than mere élite vainglory yet resulted in even 
more social upheaval and human death. The culture of modernity, now tied to the horror of the 
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Holocaust and the atom bomb, seemed less like a vehicle for positive change and more like a 
lethal taint. 
Few areas of the world were exempt from the feeling of disillusionment with interwar 
aesthetic philosophy. With the death of Josef Stalin, even the Soviet Union began to grapple with 
the effect of its governing ideology on the individual.46 Thousands of political prisoners were 
released from gulags, a tacit admission of Stalinist excesses. Meanwhile, many philosophers and 
artists of the early revolutionary period were either officially or “silently” rehabilitated, paving 
the way for the demise of socialist realism. Internationally, the revelations issued in Nikita 
Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union triggered mass abandonment of Western communist parties by intellectuals and activists, 
deradicalizing elements of Western criticism which had once looked towards the Soviet Union 
for leadership and guidance. In 1957, Howard Fast, author of Spartacus, the novel upon which 
the famously blacklist-busting film of the same name was based, wrote The Naked God: The 
Writer and the Communist Party as an account of his disillusionment with the communist 
movement. Despite the fact that he that had even spent time in prison for refusing to cooperate 
with the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Fast recalled that after the 
“Secret Speech” he felt that “The sick god was naked from the beginning; there only had to be a 
voice to proclaim the fact.”47 
Modernism as the prevailing strain in aesthetic philosophy, however, managed to hobble 
on for a few more decades. In order to respond to the failures of interwar aesthetic philosophy, 
that is, the inability to reconcile modernity as desirable with the unprecedented cruelty of the 
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Second World War, the new generation of left-wing modernists had to shift the locus of their 
epistemology, beginning with a process of “transferring their intellectual foundations from Marx 
to Freud.”48 Historical change would continue, it was hoped, but class transformation alone as its 
driving factor would have to be bolstered by other forces, namely, a deeper understanding of the 
human psyche. Such an attitude would also entail a repudiation of pure Marxian materialism—
history would have to be dependent on human nature rather than vice versa. In light of the 
movement’s setbacks, the new generation would have to argue for modernism as containing 
objective but not necessarily self-evident truths, truths which only an epistemology resembling 
experimentation would be able to reveal. As in any experiment, there would need to be a control, 
an example of a “true self” uninfluenced by culture. Such a person, an idealized primitive, would 
then allow artists and philosophers to confirm the modernist project as being aligned with the 
liberation of the human spirit. 
While primitivity had been present in aesthetic discourse for decades (as demonstrated by 
the role of neurodivergence and exoticism in Germany), it had hitherto not been used as an 
epistemological grounding for modernism itself. The first seeds of change, however, had been 
planted by Hans Prinzhorn. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the French 
artist and collector Jean Dubuffet (1901-1985) picked up where Prinzhorn left off and began 
amassing his own collection of works by non-Western, child, and neurodivergent artists.49 
Unlike Prinzhorn, however, Dubuffet actually started receiving some acclaim in the art world—
especially in the United States. In 1946, he was featured in an exhibition of School of Paris 
artists at Pierre Matisse’s gallery in New York. Dubuffet made such an impression on American 
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high culture that Newsweek ran an article which referred to him as “the darling of Parisian avant-
garde circles.”50 His art struck a chord with postwar audiences specifically because it reflected 
disillusionment with established culture,51 the idea of Europe as the center of the art world,52 and 
the politics of interwar modernists like Pablo Picasso.53 He began referring to his works as art 
brut (“raw art”), and in 1948 established a foundation, the Compagnie de l’Art Brut, to seek out 
and promote the genre.54 It was only after he brought his collection to the United States, 
however, that he became a financial success. Either way, the psychological had embedded itself 
deeply within the fabric of a new postwar aesthetic. 
 
Freudians for modernism 
While Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is not normally thought of as an aesthetic 
philosopher, he does formulate a coherent theory of art in his book Civilization and Its 
Discontents, published in 1930. The main argument of the book is that human society is shaped 
by two opposing forces that originate in the primal needs for both sexual reproduction and 
survival—forces which he dubs “Eros” and “Thanatos” after the Greek gods of love and death, 
respectively. Eros is the animal aspect of the human mind which seeks sensory pleasure above 
all, primarily of the sexual but also of the non-sexual type. It radiates a force which Freud calls 
libido, or desire. Mere Eros, however, cannot fulfil itself in the long term because it is unable to 
practice prudence or delayed gratification. Though “it is simply the pleasure-principle [Eros] 
which draws up the programme of life’s purpose,” Eros alone “is in conflict with the whole 
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world”55 and therefore can lead to severe unhappiness in addition to moments of unadulterated 
joy. 
This is where Thanatos, the “death drive,” enters the picture. Thanatos is the force of 
internalized repression which utilizes “libido-displacements” for the purpose of “transferring the 
instinctual aims into such directions that they cannot be frustrated by the outside world.”56 
According to Freud, the human mind is exceptional because it can sublimate its own unceasing 
stream of libido into other activities which will allow for its own survival, or at least the bare 
avoidance of the fact that humans exist in a world which is cruelly ambivalent to individuals’ 
sense of happiness. Thanatos, therefore, is also known as the “reality-principle.” Since the 
intensification of Thanatos is necessary for planning, organization, and productivity, Freud 
speculates that the development of civilization is directly proportionate to the domination of 
Thanatos over Eros, with the most advanced societies (western Europe and North America) 
being therefore the most repressed. The problem with the dominance of Thanatos in modern 
society is that, while self-denial helps us avoid the deepest depths of suffering, it also blunts the 
purest enjoyment of happiness. 
The enjoyment of aesthetics, in Freud’s opinion, is one of the clearest examples of 
“libido-displacement” because the “aesthetic attitude offers little protection against the menace 
of suffering, but it is able to compensate for a great deal.”57 For this reason, the hallmark of “a 
high level of civilization”58 is the omnipresence of aesthetic beauty as a cultural value. We are 
reassured against the looming threat of existential dread “when we see that the industry of the 
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inhabitants is applied as well to things which are not in the least useful and, on the contrary, 
seem to be useless,”59 i.e. art. 
One would expect from Freud’s analysis of civilization as a fundamentally repressive 
force that he advocates for a sort of pleasurable regression to a simpler point in history when 
Eros was somewhat freer. In practice, however, Freud ridicules “this strange attitude of hostility 
to civilization”60 as a romanticization of the aspects of pre- or extra-industrialized life that were 
“erroneously attributed to the absence of the complicated conditions of civilization”61 or a 
misunderstanding of the privations which did occur in the distant past. 
Despite Freud’s opposition to primitivism and his identification of art with the repression 
inherent within civilization, the intellectual vacuum of the postwar era allowed for the 
reinterpretation of his ideas by a new generation which was far more disenchanted with modern 
life. Having witnessed the frenzied triumph of “Thanatos” on the battlefields, concentration 
camps, and bombed-out cities of a supposedly civilized world, they sought something within the 
human psyche that was both peaceful and productive, thus validating the continued development 
of humanity.  
Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), a German-American philosopher identified with the 
Frankfurt School who, during the 1960s, became known “alternatively as the father, grandfather, 
or guru of the New Left”62 for his attempts to reconcile Marxism with individual freedom, sought 
to apply Freud’s theories of subconscious tug-of-war to the dialectical model of history proposed 
by Marx. The result of this effort was the book Eros and Civilization, published in 1955. The 
replacement of ruling and laboring classes with the reality- and pleasure-principles was simple 
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enough, given their method of development through contradiction, but Freud’s idea that the 
advancement of society necessarily entails increased repression appeared contrary to the Marxian 
hope of human liberation through material progress. The solution to this ostensible problem, in 
Marcuse’s formulation, drew from another of Freud’s core observations about the psyche: that 
denied urges must resurface in some form. Marcuse therefore declared that “The return of the 
repressed makes up the tabooed and subterranean history of civilization.”63 History could be 
described as a process of perpetual self-discovery, resulting in a society that was both materially 
advanced and emotionally—not to mention erotically—fulfilled. 
But what does this mean for aesthetics? Marcuse rejected Freud’s assumption that the 
presence of art in advanced societies reflected self-control and therefore the dominance of 
Thanatos. Instead, Marcuse frames art as a product of the natural proclivity towards play64— a 
core attribute of Eros. The aesthetic sentiment should thus be seen as an attempt to “reconcile the 
two spheres of the human existence [senses and the intellect] which were torn asunder by a 
repressive reality principle.”65 Art allows us to grapple with the fundamental ambivalence of the 
world without demanding rigid self-denial, “consequently, the aesthetic reconciliation implies 
strengthening sensuousness as against the tyranny of reason and, ultimately, even calls for the 
liberation of sensuousness from the repressive domination of reason.”66  
 
Clement Greenberg’s modernist essentialism 
It is difficult to define what “play” is, but it is somewhat easier to prove what it is not. In 
his book Homo Ludens, written in 1938 but only translated into English in 1949, Dutch cultural 
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theorist Johan Huizinga (1872-1945) claims a defining characteristic of play is that it “is not 
‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life.”67 Within play, “an absolute and peculiar order reigns.”68 Play is a 
voluntary system of pros and cons that exists (at least temporarily) apart from the considerations 
imposed by “reality.” If art is a form of play, as Marcuse argues, it can therefore be viewed as an 
auxiliary reality with its own rules of desire and fulfillment. This line of reasoning bears striking 
similarities to Freud’s explanation of psychosis, specifically as “One last possibility of dealing 
with life…[delusion] offers them at least substitute-gratifications.”69 Religion, according to 
Freud, also “consists in decrying the value of life and promulgating a view of the real world that 
is distorted like a delusion.”70 The value of art, therefore—like psychosis and faith—lies in the 
fact that aesthetic beauty has its own reflexive logic of the “good,” an assertion which bears a 
striking similarity to Prinzhorn’s belief that aesthetics must “count on a separate creative 
component,”71 the emphasis being on the separateness from conditioned sensibilities like wealth 
or status which go beyond the aesthetic. The best art dislocates itself from “reality” and instead 
seeks to reveal the essential aspects of its own medium. 
This approach, to evaluate aesthetics as divorced from culture, is the fundamental core of 
Clement Greenberg’s (1909-1994) art criticism, which defined the avant-garde modernism of the 
postwar era. Greenberg, a Trotskyist and native New Yorker, rose from obscurity to widespread 
esteem during the 1940s as one of America’s most inventive art critics in a time in which the 
United States was considered an afterthought in the art world.72 The publication he edited, 
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Partisan Review, soon became known as one of the foremost mouthpieces of the American 
intelligentsia. Repudiating the bipolar relationship with politics that Benjamin prescribed for art, 
Greenberg claimed of the development of modernism over the course of the past century that 
“once the avant-garde had succeeded in ‘detaching’ itself from society, it proceeded to turn 
around and repudiate revolutionary as well as bourgeois politics.”73 The imperative of aesthetics 
in society was not to express the will of the people but to seek a greater truth—“something given, 
increate, independent of meanings, similar or originals.”74 He especially disapproved of art that 
tugged on the heartstrings or located itself within the vapid language of popular culture because 
it failed to gesture towards the transcendence which he so valued. Sentimentality or exchange 
value, being present but not endemic to art, had no place within aesthetic evaluation. To 
Greenberg, popular, persuasive, or commercial art was Kitsch, a German term which refers to 
objects that claim aesthetic value for reasons other than pure aesthetic enjoyment. In his 1939 
essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Greenberg identified Kitsch with the ascendant classes of 
capitalism: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. These groups were originally situated between the 
aristocracy and the pre-modern working classes, and so the Kitsch aesthetic became identified 
with the “middlebrow”—a class which was not totally unaware of “art” as a high-status social 
institution but lacking “the leisure and comfort necessary for the enjoyment of the city’s 
traditional culture.”75 Kitsch was therefore a way for the masses to participate in the social 
benefits which art supposedly granted without carrying any objective aesthetic value. 
Since Kitsch is, Greenberg asserts, the direct result of capitalistic and thus bourgeois 
culture, he connects it with the post-liberal ideologies which arose during the interwar period. 
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The aesthetics of both fascism and communism (as headed by Stalin) were Kitsch “not because 
their respective governments are controlled by philistines, but because kitsch is the culture of the 
masses in these countries, as it is everywhere else.”76 Kitsch was “merely another of the 
inexpensive ways in which totalitarian regimes seek to ingratiate themselves with their 
subjects”77 and therefore establish control over society. This critique, while issued immediately 
before the breakout of the Second World War, provided the basis for the equivocation of Nazi 
and Stalinist aesthetic theory—in contrast to the West—in the postwar era. 
On its surface, Greenberg’s aesthetic philosophy can seem terribly elitist. It was certainly 
anti-populist, but he was careful not to exclude all forms of working-class aesthetic sensibility. 
After all, Greenberg’s political roots lay in the United States’ burgeoning communist movement. 
He composed a poem in 1940 entitled “Ode to Trotsky”78 and the Partisan Review was literally 
affiliated with the Communist Party USA. While his radical fervor cooled in the years 
immediately following the Second World War, Greenberg retained a distinctly Marxist view of 
history which influenced his aesthetic writings. He believed that a truly unpretentious art could 
be discovered among the fringes of the bourgeois ecumene—that is, “in those outlying countries 
of Western civilization over which metropolitan culture was comparatively thinly spread—
Germany, the Balkans, and North America.”79 This art could transcend both Kitsch and the 
obvious exclusivity of pre-modern hierarchy. In his essay “Primitive Painting,” Greenberg hails 
the isolated artist by observing that “His painting goes back to the first assumptions of pictorial 
art and reexamines them in all their original freshness, reminding one again of the excitement 
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there is in simply discovering that it is possible to depict three-dimensional things on a flat 
surface.”80 He suggested that primitive painters upheld the axiom of “art for art’s sake” so well 
because art was, for them, a fundamentally solipsistic exercise. Greenberg was therefore 
cautiously optimistic that primitivity could prove a useful subversion of Kitsch’s march towards 
world domination. The lowbrow with its authenticity could form an alliance with the highbrow 
and its sophistication against the middlebrow. 
That being said, Greenberg is aware that primitivity is not immune from cooption by 
Kitsch. He draws a strong contrast between genuinely primitive art and falsely “primitive” art 
manufactured for the masses to gawk at. “‘Primitive’ art,” he posits, “belongs to the Industrial 
Age,”81 It is defined by what is not—it is not “metropolitan,” academic, or commercial—
meaning that it is difficult to argue which works are genuinely “primitive.” As he notes, there is 
“a very important distinction…[between] professional ‘primitive’ painters who made a living by 
their art, and…amateur primitive painters who paint chiefly for their own satisfaction.”82 The 
former category is liable to being wrapped up in the economic forces which inspire Kitsch, and 
some are cognizant of their “primitivity” in a self-conscious way that morphs their aesthetic into 
exactly what primitive art should not be. 
Greenberg identifies surrealism as a uniquely ham-fisted attempt to feign primitivity. He 
doubts that the strategy of automatism (striving for the unadulterated output of the id) is actually 
effective since, for the most part, surrealists were still academically trained artists who only later 
in their career decided to flirt with fanciful imagery.83 They might think they can reject the 
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influence of culture through free association, but their use of the absurd and shocking reveals that 
“the desire to sin against decorum, violate all the rules, do the disreputable thing, and attach 
oneself to whatever seems discredited”84 is the true motive of their aesthetic sensibility rather 
than the impulse to create the best art. Even the supposed “avant-gardes” of the interwar era, 
therefore, were part of a “reactionary tendency which is attempting to restore ‘outside’ subject 
matter,”85 that is, failing both to separate aesthetics from tradition and provide a suitable 
epistemology for modernism. 
Having been sorely disappointed by both the aesthetics and politics emanating from 
Europe during the interwar years, Greenberg sought a new fount of creativity that would 
demonstrate his theoretical ideas. In fact, it was Greenberg who “discovered” Jean Dubuffet and 
popularized his art in the United States.86 Though he found Dubuffet personally annoying,87 
Greenberg asserted in Partisan Review that “Jean Dubuffet is perhaps the one new painter of real 
importance to have appeared on the scene in Paris in the last decade.”88 Nevertheless, he 
remained unsatisfied with Dubuffet precisely because of his Parisian origins—for critics in 
postwar America “Dubuffet was a successful painter as long as his Frenchness did not show 
through.”89 Greenberg yearned for an artist who could combine Dubuffet’s formal sensibilities 
with a non-European persona. Fortunately, Greenberg discovered Jackson Pollock and was 
immediately won over. “He is the first painter I know of to have got something positive from the 
muddiness of color that so profoundly characterizes a great deal of American painting,” 
Greenberg waxed in his first review of Pollock’s art, “[His works] are among the strongest 
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abstract paintings I have yet seen by an American.”90 Greenberg also compared Pollock and 
Dubuffet favorably.91 From then on, Greenberg and Partisan Review became the most prominent 
defenders of the genre which later became known as Abstract Expressionism. 
 
Theory in action: Brutalism 
In any other decade, Abstract Expressionism might have remained confined to the United 
States. Hitherto, the centers of the avant-gardes had been located almost exclusively in Europe. 
America was considered far too provincial to push the boundaries of high culture. The Second 
World War, however, radically changed this state of affairs. In the aftermath of the conflict, the 
roles between the United States and Europe were reversed. Instead of Americans receiving and 
being scandalized by the cultural output of an innovative Europe, the arrival of Abstract 
Expressionism struck the Old World off guard. “Europeans…had been brought up against the art 
of Jackson Pollock for the first time, and without any preparation by the European art-press, at 
the ‘Biennale di Venezia’ of 1950,”92 years after his work had become widely celebrated across 
the Atlantic. Furthermore, art brut had become far more popular in the US than it had ever been 
in its native Europe.93 The new aesthetic radiating from New York “was almost completely 
incomprehensible to European eyes,”94 but made a big impression to a younger generation of 
artists, critics, and theoreticians who lamented the persistence of socialist realism, Surrealism, 
and other interwar aesthetics.  
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American ideas had a specific resonance in the United Kingdom, where the postwar “hang-over” 
was particularly difficult to dispel. The country was not only economically and culturally sapped 
by the war effort but also physically blighted by German bombing campaigns. Wartime rationing 
and economic sluggishness dragged on into the 1950s, far longer than Britain’s neighbors and 
allies. The country’s Labour government, in addition to their economic and social 
interventionism, viewed the postwar slump as a crisis of morale that could be at least partially 
assuaged by public pageantry. In 1951, therefore, the government hosted the “Festival of 
Britain,” an exhibition (in the Victorian sense of the term) of Britain’s history and 
accomplishments. The site, located on the South Bank of the Thames, was to be converted into a 
showcase of modern Britain. The persistence of interwar modernism in the immediate postwar, 
however, turned the project into a charming but somewhat awkward tribute to “post-war 
themes…gelled in a picturesque whimsy.”95 The Festival was a moderate success in terms of 
revenue and visitor satisfaction,96 but the event failed to present established British modernism as 
a promising current in architecture and design. According to Peter Moro, one of the architects 
who designed the Royal Festival Hall, the whole affair served to bookend rather than rejuvenate 
the kind of modernism which had dominated the 1940s.97 Moreover, the Festival of Britain failed 
to save the Labour government, which was defeated in the general election of the same year. 
The challenge of rebuilding Britain’s cities, combined with the mixed results of the 
Festival of Britain, offered the chance of a critical juncture in British architecture. For Peter and 
Alison Smithson (1923-2003 and 1928-1993), a husband-and-wife architect duo, postwar 
England proved to be fertile ground for experimentation. Their greatest inspiration originated in 
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the ethos of Abstract Expressionism and therefore Greenberg’s interest in discovering the 
essence of aesthetic taste, an epistemological strategy which they hoped would confirm the 
modernist project. Concrete, with its unassuming versatility and simplicity, became their medium 
of choice. They called their aesthetic “New Brutalism,” which evolved in the popular lexicon to 
simply “Brutalism.” 
The reason why the Smithsons adopted this term is contested, and there are a handful of 
overlapping theories. Reyner Banham, at the time a critic for The Architectural Review, 
gradually associated himself with the movement, and in his writings articulated its history and 
theoretical basis. In Banham’s 1966 retrospective on the movement, The New Brutalism: Ethic 
or Aesthetic? he notes that the Swedish architect Hans Asplund (not to be confused with fellow 
Swedish modernist Gunnar Asplund) claimed to have invented the term in 1950 in order to 
describe a house in Uppsala designed by colleagues at his firm.98 The Smithsons, on the other 
hand, seem to imply through their artists’ statements that the French phrase béton brut (“raw 
concrete”), popularized by Le Corbusier, is the actual inspiration for the term “Brutalism.”99 The 
Smithsons’ insistence that Brutalism derives from Le Corbusier complicates Asplund’s account 
because the house which he was referring to—the Villa Göth—has an exterior in brick as 
opposed to raw concrete. (Fig. 2)100 According to Banham, the ostensible contradiction between 
these two etymologies can be resolved through a third theory: that “Brutalism” derives from the 
word brut in the sense of “raw” or “unsophisticated.”101 This theory draws a connection between 
béton brut, the art brut movement, and the supposedly “anti-artistic” qualities of Abstract 
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Expressionism. It is for this reason that Banham contends that Brutalism is “an ethic, not an 
aesthetic.”102 Concrete does not define Brutalism, but rather is a rhetorical technique that helps 
articulate its theoretical argument. 
In 1955, Banham published a short essay in The Architectural Review which served to 
synthesize the philosophy of Brutalism. He pithily summarizes the precepts of the movement as 
“1, Formal legibility of plan; 2, clear exhibition of structure; and 3, valuation of materials for 
their inherent qualities ‘as found.’”103 For Banham, a building should be the sum of its functions, 
materials, and nothing more. Although he does not mention it directly, is it clear that this ethos is 
fundamentally an application of Greenberg’s ideas about painting to architecture, conveyed 
through the transatlantic crosspollination of Abstract Expressionism. That being said, Banham 
goes further than Greenberg in connecting these ideas to the epistemology of modernism itself. 
By mentioning that “The New Brutalism has to be seen against the background of the recent 
history of history, and, in particular, the growing sense of inner history of the Modern Movement 
itself,”104 he recognizes that the logic of modernism could no longer rely on the dialectic model 
of history grounded in “Marxism’s Golden Age, when you could recognize a capitalist when you 
met him.”105 Instead, Brutalism expresses the need to generate a new historicism based on 
objective truths about human nature, one that maintains “that it is even ‘possible’ to make a 
moral stand about matters of design.”106 Whereas Greenberg merely implies that the primitive 
could provide a path forward for modernism, Banham basically states it outright when he 
celebrates Brutalism’s “brutality, its je-m’en-foutisme, its bloody-mindedness.”107 
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That being said, how can Brutalism be seen as an actual innovation upon the modernisms that 
preceded the Second World War? Formally, Brutalism appears little different from Le 
Corbusier’s experiments in béton brut, and specifically his idea of Unité d’habitation (“Housing 
unit”) which built upon theoretical principles he formulated in the 1920s.108 Indeed, Banham 
attests that even Alison Smithson recognized that “when you open a new volume of ‘Oeuvre 
complète’ you discover that Corb has already had the best ideas you have just thought up.”109 
Brutalism therefore felt deeply indebted to Le Corbusier’s interwar work. Despite this fact, the 
Smithsons and their allies could also be recognized as the force which led to the collapse of the 
Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne (CIAM), an association of modernist architects 
from across Europe founded in 1928 by many of the continent’s rising stars including Le 
Corbusier himself.110 Over the course of the 1930s, CIAM developed into one of the key organs 
of the international modernist movement. Despite the radical roots of the association, CIAM had 
by the end of the Second World War assumed an “establishment” role in architectural circles, a 
position which attracted criticism from the generation of architects which came of age after the 
war.111 In the wake of the organization’s 1954 conference in Aix-en-Provence, a group of 
younger architects including the Smithsons began issuing statements faulting the older 
generation for “building yesterday’s dreams when the rest of us have woken up in today.”112 
They believed that the establishment was too bogged down in providing adequate housing for the 
urban masses rather than utilizing aesthetics as a tool for discovering objectivity. The faction 
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began calling itself “Team Ten” (also stylized as “Team-X”). They demanded a rejuvenation of 
modernism for its own sake as opposed to mere slum clearance or functionality. In response, 
CIAM allowed Team-X to coordinate the association’s next conference at Dubrovnik on 
Yugoslavia’s Adriatic coast,113 a move which only served to divide the community further, thus 
resulting in its dissolution over the course of the late 1950s. David had defeated Goliath, 
demonstrating the depth of the postwar generational divide. 
The ironic contrast between the bitterness of the schism in CIAM and the strong formal 
similarity between Brutalism and its interwar predecessors led the British artist Toni del Renzio 
(1915-2007) to note that it seemed like the guiding tenet of Brutalism was “Do as Corb does, not 
as Corb says.”114 We may therefore view Brutalism more as a current in aesthetic philosophy 
with a few stylistic hallmarks rather than a style with a complementary manifesto, as interwar art 
movements like surrealism had been so wont to do. Le Corbusier had gestured towards this 
understanding of modernism in his 1923 book Towards a New Architecture when he declared 
that “A great new epoch has begun. There exists a new spirit…The ‘styles’ are a lie,”115 but the 
Brutalists felt that these precepts had been insufficiently practiced by many in Le Corbusier’s 
own generation owing to their political or aesthetic commitments to quoditian taste. Only art for 
its own sake, they believed, could fulfil Le Corbusier’s vision. 
 
THE CRISIS OF MODERNIZATION 
As the postwar era wore on, modernism persisted as the dominant mode in aesthetic 
philosophy. The United States poured money into western Europe, remaking it in its own image. 
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Meanwhile, the death of Josef Stalin and the subsequent “de-Stalinization” of Soviet culture 
enabled the reintroduction of the transnational avant-gardes into the Eastern Bloc. From a 
material standpoint, however, the most important changes of the postwar order were not the 
rearrangement of the world along dual lines. The world population growth rate reached new 
highs in the wake of the Second World War, triggering a renaissance in Malthusian views such 
as those expressed by William Vogt’s Road to Survival and Fairfield Osborn’s Our Plundered 
Planet, both published in 1948.116 Catastrophe would be at hand, they alleged, if human 
population growth was not curbed. Nevertheless, global famine did not occur, testifying to the 
exceptional progress that modernized public health, agriculture, and industry had made nearly 
everywhere. It was the acknowledgement of modernization’s persistent tempo, therefore, which 
defined modern life in the postwar era. 
Modernization and modernism, while deeply intertwined, are not interchangeable. Quite 
simply, modernization is a material process while modernism is an aesthetic movement which 
aims to grapple with the consequences of modernization. Modernization had been ongoing 
before the emergence of modernism and would continue after its protracted decline. For interwar 
modernists, modernization was the impetus for their call to renew aesthetics. Le Corbusier 
upheld “the engineer’s aesthetic”117 as the mode to which contemporary architects should aspire. 
He therefore exalts ocean liners, grain elevators, and airplanes because their hulking, utilitarian 
forms express the unbridled spirit of modernization. The postwar modernists, on the other hand, 
did not celebrate modernization for its own sake. The Second World War demonstrated the 
destructive capabilities of usually benign technology. The airplane, for instance, had gone from 
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Le Corbusier’s favored example of how war “had mobilized invention, intelligence and 
daring”118 to the carrier of the atom bomb and therefore the harbinger of human self-destruction. 
This is not to say that the postwar generation rejected modernization as a whole—such an 
attitude would be evidently anti-modernist. Rather, modernization was recast as the ambient 
process which revealed aesthetic truths as it progressed. It provided the basis for modernism, 
giving it meaning and a sense of direction, but it no longer dictated the movement’s aesthetic 
content. 
While modernism anticipated and celebrated the continued pace of modernization, many 
of the most influential modernists failed to fully take into account the transformative 
implications that would accompany shifts in the perception of modernization. If modernization 
continued to the point that even the most “marginal” spaces of the emergent Western-oriented 
world experienced technological, economic, and thus cultural change, what would remain of the 
primitive which, since the Second World War, had played such a crucial role in modernism’s 
own epistemology? For our purposes, the actual extent of modernization does not matter so 
much as the perception that modernization had overturned the cultural underpinnings of 
primitivity. 
 
The end of political art 
Meanwhile, the political profile of modernism continued its shift away from interwar 
ideologies. The reaction against Stalinist and fascist aesthetics among boosters of modernism 
ironically had the effect of reconciling them with the governing ideologies of the West. Clement 
Greenberg’s early writings, including “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” convey a willingness to place 
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aesthetics above and apart from politics with the goal of keeping “culture moving in the midst of 
ideological confusion and violence,”119 an attitude which can be seen as directly refuting 
Benjamin’s explanation of art in the bourgeois era as being connected at the hip with political 
ideology. As competition between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, 
Greenberg’s attitude of detachment towards politics shifted into a tacit condonation of the 
American side. 
By 1948, Greenberg, the once militant socialist, defined himself as an “ex- or disabused 
Marxist.”120 He and his colleagues began taking advantage of cultural venues maintained by the 
US government. Greenberg’s seminal essay “Modernist Painting,” for instance, was published by 
Voice of America (VOA), a production company which broadcasted propaganda and American 
cultural exports deep behind the Iron Curtain.121 As internal opposition to American foreign 
policy swelled over the course of the sixties, Partisan Review faced increasing allegations of ties 
with the CIA. The editors of the magazine vehemently denied that they were receiving support 
from government propagandists, and in 1967 they published a statement clarifying their 
“opposition to the secret subsidization by the CIA of literary and intellectual publications and 
organizations.”122 Nevertheless, British historian Frances Stonor Saunders alleges in her 1999 
book Who Paid the Piper? (published in the United States as The Cultural Cold War) that 
Partisan Review and several other left-wing publications had quietly accepted funding from the 
American wing of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a CIA-backed organization 
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dedicated to combating communist influence in academia and culture.123 The CCF funded 
publications around the world in dozens of languages, all with the tacit goal of subverting Soviet-
aligned thought. The Partisan Review was a valuable asset to the CIA precisely because of the 
reversal in soft power occasioned by Abstract Expressionism and allied genres. It was, according 
to literary critic Leslie Fiedler, “the most read [American journal] in Europe.”124 
Stonor Saunders’s revelations were and continue to be controversially received, 
specifically because of the tenuousness of the relationship between the CCF and the magazines it 
funded. The CCF’s approach was not directive or even dependent on publishing predetermined 
material. Instead, the organization would reward friendly behavior with travel grants and other 
forms of small funding.125 That being said, the sheer number of publications with which the CCF 
was involved demonstrates the importance the CIA placed on waging a “literary Cold War.” It is 
far more likely, considering the piecemeal but widely diffused nature of the CCF’s influence, 
that the CIA saw Partisan Review and others like it not as a puppet but rather an anti-communist 
ally—a state of affairs which indicates the extent to which Greenberg’s generation had become 
comfortable with American ideological aims. 
 
The aesthetics of decolonization 
In Africa, the CCF underwrote a number of literary magazines dedicated to boosting that 
continent’s writers, including Black Orpheus in Nigeria and Transition Magazine in Uganda. 
Ironically, Black Orpheus was founded by a German Jew, Ulli Beier, who arrived in Nigeria in 
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1950 with his wife, the artist Susanne Wenger.126 At that point, the country was still a British 
colony. Like many other artists and critics of the postwar era, the couple was “disillusioned by 
the failed promise of technological progress in the aftermath of World War II, [and] embarked on 
a journey to reestablish a connection with the irrational, mysterious life forces tragically lost by 
modern Europe.”127 While Beier assembled exemplary works of African writing for his 
magazine, Wenger became a priestess of the traditional Yoruba religion. She began creating 
spiritual art, much of which Beier publicized in Black Orpheus under the Africanized pseudonym 
“Sangodare Akanji.”128 He believed that Wenger had been “redeemed”129 by her contact with 
indigenous mysticism—despite her background in the Viennese avant-garde. Beier’s notions 
about the relationship between art and non-European cultures was heavily inspired by Jean 
Dubuffet’s art brut, and he complemented his discussions of religious art with accounts of 
neurodivergent artists.130 This juxtaposition, however, demonstrates the attitude that Beier 
implicitly held towards Africa, despite his ostensible efforts to provide a platform for African 
writers and artists. He valued the highly complex traditions of Yoruba religiosity and the art of 
institutionalized mental patients for the same reason: that they were somehow both brut, that 
they both embodied a refreshing primitivity that Europe lacked. 
Even the name of the magazine demonstrates the epistemological value Beier ascribed to 
African culture. The phrase “Black Orpheus” references an essay of the same name by Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980) which served as the preface for an anthology of poetry by Léopold Senghor, 
a Senegalese poet who later served as that country’s president. In it, Sartre reflects upon 
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négritude, a budding literary movement in French-speaking Africa that represented an early 
example of French-language literary output originating outside of Europe. He argues that African 
and diasporic writers, facing the cultural derangement of colonialism, “must indeed, one day, 
return to Africa…[a] redescent into the bursting Hell of the black soul…[like] Orpheus going to 
reclaim Eurydice from Pluto.”131 Being “torn between ‘civilization’ and his ancient black 
roots,”132 Sartre believes that Africans possess a unique insight into the dialectic. For this reason, 
he states that “Negro poetry in the French language is, in our times, the sole great revolutionary 
poetry.”133 The “Black Orpheus,” therefore, refers to the role that postwar modernists hoped that 
Africans would play in fulfilling a progressive vision of history. With one foot in the primitive 
and the other on the vanguard of revolutionary change, they would rescue Eurydice (the 
European proletariat) from herself. 
By choosing to evoke Sartre’s essay in the name of his literary magazine, Beier 
demonstrated that the purpose of his exploration of African aesthetics transcended a mere 
interest in providing a venue for the continent’s own cultural consumption. He wanted to 
position Africa as a mirror by which European modernists could look back at themselves. As 
Sartre notes, “the white man has enjoyed for three thousand years the privilege of seeing without 
being seen,”134 a state of affairs which he believed négritude would alter. By using the Hegelian 
language of “being seen,” it becomes clear that both Sartre and Beier believed the relationship 
between Africa and Europe constituted a master-slave dialectic which, having been disturbed by 
African self-consciousness, would allow Europe to achieve deeper self-awareness. 
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The attempts of Black Orpheus and the négritude movement to imbue Africa with a sense 
of its own internal history, however, accompanied great changes across the continent which 
ultimately challenged modernism itself. Africa—along with Asia and certain parts of the 
Americas—was awakening not only from a literary or artistic perspective, but also politically 
and economically. The most obvious development was the sudden explosion of newly 
independent states.135 In 1956, there were no independent sub-Saharan states except Ethiopia, 
Liberia, and South Africa, which was then still under white minority rule. A mere decade later, 
32 more countries had joined them. These nations, however, were not the direct successors of the 
pre-colonial cultures so admired by Beier and Wenger, nor did they wish to be. They developed 
their own nationalisms predicated on engaging with the rest of the world as equals. 
The word of the day was modernization, although in the minds of Africa’s newly 
empowered indigenous governments that often meant the construction of “modern 
airports, …luxury hotels, sports stadiums, and international convention centers”136 rather than 
infrastructure for the average citizen. These structures borrowed from the trends that were 
currently most popular in Europe or North America. Brutalism, ironically, found fertile ground in 
many of these newly independent countries. Legitimizing one’s non-European national identity 
through “excelling” at Europe’s own cultural practices was not a novel strategy. After all, Ismail 
Pasha attempted the same thing in commissioning Aida almost a century earlier. The effect of 
this strategy, however, was the gradual levelling of perceived cultural differences between the 
center and periphery. 
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The case of Kenya is particularly illustrative. Kenya’s path to independence began in the 
early 1950s with the Mau Mau Uprising, a revolt against land dispossession which gripped the 
country for nine years, after which Kenya won its independence from Britain. Although many of 
the leaders of the young country (including President Jomo Kenyatta) were veterans or 
sympathizers of the Mau Mau movement, they realized that in order to compete on the global 
market without colonial support Kenya would have to invest heavily in the modernization of the 
economy and its reorientation around a handful of cash crops.137 As architectural critic Manuel 
Herz explains, “The city [Nairobi] and the nation that Kenyatta then inherited were the products 
of a largely oppressive history. But rather than making this background and the conflict that it 
embodied central to his rule, Kenyatta presented himself as a conciliatory leader opposed to 
socialism and open to the maintenance of global commercial networks.”138 This was a pattern 
which was replicated across the continent. Instead of reversing the ills of colonialism, therefore, 
independence actually accelerated the perception that public life at both the top (with regards to 
aesthetic production) and bottom (with regards to economic conditions) of post-colonial societies 
participated in an emerging world culture. 
The operative word here, however, is perception. As geographer Edward Soja states in a 
1968 analysis of modernization in Kenya, “Among the many effects of European colonization 
has been the spread of a world culture based on modern science and technology and specific 
standards of government organization and operation.”139 By referring to a culture based on 
“science and technology” as well as “specific standards,” Soja references the cultural 
implications of global capitalism’s rapid expansion during colonialism. Thus, the British regime 
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had already set capital-oriented modernization in motion decades before independence, despite 
the image furthered by ventures like Ulli Beier’s Black Orpheus which suggested that primitivity 
had remained relatively intact in Africa. In fact, modernization’s effect on traditional societies 
and economic structures had been a key cause of the Mau Mau Uprising. According to African 
historian Frederick Cooper, the Mau Mau creed “was indeed anti-modern, rejecting more about 
developmentalist [aspects of] colonialism than the fact that it was colonial”140 Kenya’s young 
leaders, therefore, inherited a country with the demands of a modernized economy (i.e., foreign 
investment) but a primitive image abroad. 
As such, the leaders of Africa’s newly independent countries were heavily focused in the 
1960s and ‘70s on curating the perception of their continent as having rapidly modernized since 
independence. In Nairobi, specifically, architectural landmarks like the Kenyatta International 
Conference Center (KICC) (Fig. 3)141 and the University of Nairobi “position Kenya, and 
Nairobi in particular, as a worthy equal to their global counterparts.”142 The significance of these 
structures as palpable symbols of Africa’s willing participation in world economic systems 
reached its zenith in 1973 when the KICC hosted the World Bank’s global summit.143 Of these 
seminal modernist projects, however, “Neither…articulates a development agenda.”144 Neither 
the KICC nor the University of Nairobi were intended to accommodate the everyday Kenyan, 
many of whom suffered in extreme poverty. Whether or not Africa had actually transformed 
economically in the first years after decolonization, the architectural output of the immediate 
post-colonial period demonstrates that independence was nevertheless used as an opportunity to 
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reimagine the continent’s image. The products of modernism in Africa, such as the KICC, reveal 
“the continent’s importance in global consciousness at the time”145 and consequently the 
impression that post-colonial modernization had sent primitivity in Africa on its way to 
extinction. 
The prevailing conception of colonial rule among the Left in the West was that the 
relation between the metropole and the working classes of the Global South was quasi-feudal in 
nature, attached through foreign military occupation of colonized lands. It is because of this 
enforced subjugation, a connection which exists beside the bonds of mere capitalism, that Sartre 
claims black artists are “held to authenticity.”146 The efforts of countries such as Kenya to 
aggressively market themselves, however, gave the impression that their class structure had 
suddenly switched to one that is totally mediated by capitalism. Thus, through the political and 
economic changes of the postwar era, the masses of the Global South—once singled out by 
Sartre as a class distinct from the European proletariat but still existing within a Europe-
dominated world order—began to be understood as subject to a logic of capital more resembling 
that affecting workers in London, Paris, or Chicago. The classes which to Beier and others had 
represented a vestigial or primitive way of life were reconceptualized as a bona fide proletariat. 
Decolonization, however, did not change the fact that most newly independent states 
were in practice utterly dependent on the metropole. It simply shifted the framing of this 
dependence from being enforced by overtly sociopolitical factors (the fact of unwilling 
occupation) to “economic” ones. The transformation embodied by decolonization was in turn 
mirrored by the movements against de jure privilege within Europe and North America—that is, 
the civil rights movements and the reforms which they inspired. In the case of the American 
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South, enforced racial hierarchy proved a substantial hindrance to economic development. In the 
wake of the famous chaos surrounding school integration in Little Rock, for instance, industrial 
investment in Arkansas fell from $130 million to $25 million from 1956 to 1958.147 The most 
significant fault line of popular support for segregation among whites at the time was class, with 
the “upper-class business leaders [being]…more open to desegregation than the population as the 
whole.”148 This pattern was not restricted to Arkansas. When faced with cultural shifts 
occasioned by more intense scrutiny, “the overwhelming majority of Southern business concerns 
opted to accept desegregation rather than close.”149 For the almost entirely white Southern 
bourgeoisie, the end of segregation meant the lifting of a heavy burden. The poverty-stricken 
region was officially “open for business.” The lack of redistribution of capital assured continued 
white domination of the upper classes, but now the justification for this state of affairs was 
“meritocratic” rather than traditional. The Southern aristocracy, just as the élites of newly 
independent African nations, could assimilate into a bourgeoisie which transcended the 
provinciality of their region. Correspondingly, the civil rights movement enabled the conversion 
of a separate African American cultural experience enforced by legal discrimination into merely 
another facet of proletarian culture—the culture of poverty. 
The effect of modernization, therefore, was the perceived consolidation of unique class 
structures in both the Global North and South into a bifurcated framework that more closely 
characterizes capitalism. The pre-modern working classes once held down by colonialism or 
enforced discrimination were consolidated into a globalized proletariat while the élites who 
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benefited from their oppression were consolidated into a globalized bourgeoisie. Thus, the West 
learned to understand not only literally distant societies as being subject to the same economic 
laws which govern themselves, but also those societies who were more figuratively far from 
political and economic power, including oppressed minorities within their own countries. 
But what did this mean for aesthetics? From a Greenbergian perspective, the 
subordination of the class system to the logic of capital poses a threat to non-Kitsch art. As 
Greenberg states in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” “Kitsch is a product of the industrial revolution 
which urbanized the masses of Western Europe and America… [that is] The peasants who settled 
in the cities as proletariat and petty bourgeois.”150 When Greenberg wrote this description in 
1939, he was able to defend highbrow art and promote lowbrow art because he believed that 
there still existed aristocratic and pre-modern working classes whose taste remained undistorted 
by Kitsch and therefore capitalism. The alliance of “authenticity” against Kitsch was frustrated. 
The primitive, whether located within “civilization” (as with neurodivergent art) or outside it (as 
with African traditions) was recontextualized within an emerging capitalist world culture. 
Perceived primitivity, therefore, could no longer maintain its place within the epistemology of 
modernism. With the theoretical division between art and everyday culture rendered untenable, 
the search for objectivity was complicated. 
 
TOWARDS A POSTMODERN POPULISM 
In 1953, Rathenower Optische Werke, one of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) 
largest lens manufacturers, released a series of stereographic cards depicting the newly 
constructed “Stalinallee,” the monumental axis of Berlin’s Soviet zone. Viewed through a 
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stereoscope, the cards emphasize the saturated colors of the gardens, the wide airiness of the 
rotaries, and the sheer mass of the gleaming-white apartment blocks lining the boulevard. (Fig. 
4)151 The whole scene is quite literally larger than life. This is exactly the effect which East 
Germany’s Soviet-aligned government desired. Soviet architects and planners taught their 
German counterparts to manifest the state’s “centralization, hierarchy, and monumentality”152 in 
public architecture. Terms such as “formalism” and “cosmopolitanism,” on the other hand, were 
used to label and disparage the simplified and rational tendencies of international modernist 
architecture. The aesthetic that guided Stalinallee was hardly a rebuke of Nazi artistic prejudices, 
and in fact the monumentality of the boulevard bore striking parallels to a plan drafted by Albert 
Speer, Hitler’s head architect, to completely remake Berlin (or Germania as it was to be known) 
in a lavish faux-classical style.153 
Observers and critics in the West “relentlessly pilloried”154 the Stalinallee project. The 
East German government’s attempt to “sell” the still-depleted country’s success through eye-
popping but fundamentally cheap and inauthentic façades soon became an object lesson on the 
connection between socialist realism and Kitsch.155 To Western eyes, the boulevard was 
overwrought, ornamental, and distanced itself insufficiently from the city’s Nazi past—in short, 
a total affront to the Greenbergian consensus. Ironically, the construction of Stalinallee was 
almost immediately followed by the death of Stalin and the hectic drive within Soviet-aligned 
countries to scrub their civic vocabulary of his influence. Pressure to de-Stalinize led the East 
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German government to rename the boulevard Karl-Marx-Allee, erasing any official connection 
to the aesthetic philosophy of the interwar. Once imagined as a spectacular showcase, East 
Berlin’s most imposing boulevard languished for decades. 
After reunification, however, Karl-Marx-Allee began attracting renewed attention from 
unexpected corners. Philip Johnson (1906-2005), a renowned American architect who had once 
been a devoted acolyte of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe but evolved in later decades into “the 
chameleon architect of high capitalism,” claimed that he had been a proponent of the boulevard 
from the beginning and that he considered it to be “true city planning in the grand style.”156 Aldo 
Rossi, the Italian architect who won the Pritzker Prize the year Germany reunified157 dubbed it 
“Europe’s last great street.”158 The boulevard that had been the object of Western derision 
suddenly, in the eyes of some important architectural tastemakers, attained acclaim in spite of (or 
possibly even because of) the site’s provocative kitschness. 
What happened? How did the trends of the postwar era—against Kitsch, sentimentality, 
decoration, and all of the other characteristics which defined interwar aesthetics—reverse 
themselves within a few decades? How did seeing the world through the warped lens of the 
stereoscope become desired—not merely accepted or denied? The sensibilities of the new era 
seemed to fly in the face of modernism, and indeed pronounced its demise in the name of a new 
“postmodernism.” The genealogy and characteristics of postmodernism, however, reveals that it 
is the product of the same force which tore apart late modernism: perceived modernization. 
Despite the rift implied by the word “postmodern,” the seemingly dramatic reversal in 
aesthetic sensibility was not fomented by the same sort of generational rupture which had 
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separated the postwar cohort from their predecessors. Crucial thinkers and concepts carried over 
from late modernism into postmodernism, lending the newer movement its theoretical basis. 
Reyner Banham, though one of Brutalism’s foremost advocates in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
transformed himself over the course of a couple years into a narrator of the postmodern reaction. 
Much of the theoretical literature which commentated on postmodernism continued to fit the 
upheavals of the late 20th century into the traditions, if not the frameworks, of Western Marxism 
and Freudian thought.  
Jean Baudrillard’s work is emblematic of the continued attempts to place class and 
psychoanalytic analysis in conversation with aesthetic change. His book Simulacra and 
Simulation, though published in 1981, envisions the postmodern decoupling of signifier and 
signified as a delayed consequence of capital’s separation of exchange- from use-value, the 
process which enabled the practice of accumulation for something more than mere utilization. “It 
was capital that first fed on the destruction of every referential,”159 Baudrillard claims, tying 
Greenberg’s critique of Kitsch to the rupture in the connection between art’s role as a status 
object (and thus its social “exchange value”) and its aesthetic value. What has changed, however, 
is that Baudrillard turns capitalism’s logic of “deterrence, abstraction, disconnection, 
deterritorialization, etc.”160 in on itself. He criticizes the Left’s attempts to attack capital 
“according to moral or economic rationality”161 because it fails to recognize that “Capital, in fact, 
was never linked by a contract to the society that it dominates,”162 an assertion which itself 
echoes the Greenbergian critique of value. Baudrillard even remarks that contemporary left-wing 
thought entails “no need for revolution: it suffices that capital accommodate itself to the rational 
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formula of exchange.”163 Baudrillard thus subverts Marxism by extrapolating the postwar 
generation’s cultural applications of Marxist principles. As such, he embodies the continuity 
between postmodernism and late modernism. For this reason, Simulacra and Simulation can be 
treated as an account of the postmodern transformation from the perspective of one of its 
participants. 
  
Postmodern epistemology and ethnology 
Ethnology of the primitive had become a core epistemological tool of modernism just as 
perceived modernization was beginning to revolutionize the image of cultures which had been 
identified as “primitive.” Baudrillard thus argues that ethnology, the most straightforward 
instrument by which social science engaged with primitivity, suffered a crisis of confidence. He 
illustrates the “paradoxical death”164 of the field by describing the story of the Tasaday, a 
supposedly uncontacted tribe “discovered” in 1971 deep in the forests of the Philippines by a 
group headed by Manuel Elizalde, an associate of President Ferdinand Marcos. An international 
media circus ensued, including a series of articles in National Geographic on the “Stone Age 
Cavemen of Mindanao.” Nestled among advertisements for watches and cars, the magazine 
depicts the Tasaday as a pristine people, lacking a word for “war”165 and monogamous for life.166 
Instead of allowing the emerging world culture to consume them, “the Philippine government 
decided to return the few dozen Tasaday…to their primitive state, out of the reach of colonizers, 
tourists, and ethnologists.”167 Baudrillard argues that by encasing the Tasaday within “the glass 
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coffin of the virgin forest,”168 society revealed its true priorities. Primitivity could no longer 
provide fodder for modernist experimentation. 
In Baudrillard’s perspective, it did not matter that the Tasaday’s seclusion was 
inauthentic—their “primitivity” dependent on ethnology rather than the reverse—or that 
mounting evidence suggested that the Tasaday were not, in fact, uncontacted, but rather an 
impoverished indigenous band with links to settled tribes around them.169 What mattered to the 
global public, according to Baudrillard, was that the image of primitivity remained, whether or 
not the Tasaday constituted a holdout of “genuine” primitivity. The military’s approach to 
psychiatric illness fakers was “If he is this good at acting crazy, it’s because he is.”170 To 
Baudrillard, the Tasaday affair demonstrates the extent to which the attitude of simulation for its 
own sake appears to have been adopted by the world as a whole. If someone is this good at 
acting “primitive,” it is futile to try and determine if he is not. 
Once liberated from the burden of objectivity, free from needing a “control” or even 
believing that it is even possible to systemize human nature, Baudrillard declares that “We are all 
Tasaday”171 in the eyes of postmodern ethnology. Far from evaporating along with its traditional 
subjects, ethnology “survives in an antiethnology whose task it is to reinject the difference 
fiction, the Savage fiction everywhere, to conceal that it is this world, ours, which has again 
become savage in its way, that is to say, which is devastated by difference and death.”172 The 
postwar modernists, disillusioned with the masses of their countries, banished the object of 
ethnological evaluation to the margins of the Eurocentric world. Now, with “the Savage fiction” 
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and the idea that human nature is fundamentally unknowable, all people had ethnological value. 
If nobody is the “savage,” then we all are. 
This is not to say that postmodern ethnology, like modernization and the supposed 
emergence of a world culture, ignores or eliminates differences between groups of humans. In 
fact, as Baudrillard notes, it aims to “reinject the difference fiction,”—the notion that 
globalization has been anything other than a centripetal process on individual cultures. Just as 
intentionally limiting contact with the Tasaday served to maintain the simulacrum of primitivity 
at the expense of what earlier generations of social scientists would have identified as objective 
truth, focusing on identity served to maintain the image of difference. Identity-based political 
discourse across the Global North therefore fed off of the ongoing movements for decolonization 
and civil rights, even though (ironically) these movements also enabled capital to extinguish 
difference. 
For those with intellectual disabilities or mental illnesses, for example, civil rights meant 
a long process of deinstitutionalization: the process by which long-term mental hospitals and 
asylums were closed and their residents restored to public life or dispersed among group homes. 
Art brut, being grounded in these types of institutions, faced an existential challenge. In the 
English-speaking world, art brut was translated as “outsider art” and took on a meaning greater 
than Jean Dubuffet intended.173 While Dubuffet defined art brut as “a critical concept supporting 
a theorization that aims to explore the notion of art itself,”174 outsider art was broadened to 
include “all forms of work that rebel against official art, whether or not they were self-taught 
auteurs situated outside the art mainstream.”175 Outsider art was now conceived in relation to the 
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narratives of its practitioners rather than as an objective epistemological tool. Borrowing from 
the language of civil rights, outsider art (including art brut) became a form of what sociologist 
Gary Alan Fine calls “identity art”176— art valued for “the social location of the artists that links 
the works together, not formal qualities of the work.” In the United States, outsider art came to 
be subsumed into the even larger category of “folk art,” a label which fused it with the popular 
and commercial traditions of North America, that is, exactly the type of art which (owing to its 
persuasive or utilitarian rather than purely aesthetic value) would either be described as narodny 
or Kitsch by the theoreticians of socialist realism or Clement Greenberg, respectively.177 
Whereas art brut had a transcendental and ideological purpose, folk art indulged the public’s 
natural curiosity. It is this lack of fundamental applicability which led Baudrillard to state that 
“Nothing changes when society breaks the mirror of madness (abolishes the asylums, gives 
speech back to the insane, etc.) …and [decides] to bend down before the ‘differences.’”178 
 
Populism and the precession of simulacra 
Modernism as a current in aesthetic thought and modernization as a material process had 
never been so at odds. The ostensible “liquidation” of primitivity, therefore, was a substantial 
blow to the modernist movement. That being said, modernization only threatened modernism 
because of the epistemological shift within the movement following the Second World War. 
From the perspective of traditional Marxism, the dialectic (and therefore meaningful historical 
change) is certainly not resolved by mere modernization since the ultimate confrontation 
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between working and owning classes is yet to occur. If one accepts historical materialism, then 
human “nature” is merely a symptom of material conditions and class struggle continues. The 
Marxian material conception of human “nature” contradicts the Freudian conception which 
posits behavior as arising from a baseline set of subconscious needs and desires, regardless of 
material conditions. As Carl E. Schorske explains, Freudian thought appealed to the postwar Left 
because it implied (à la Marcuse) that the proletariat’s complicity in horrors of the Second World 
War and Stalin’s purges did not represent the genuine nature of the modern man but rather a 
warped and repressed version of it,179 thereby preserving the hope of human liberation through 
modernism. Understanding the undistorted, unrepressed “primitive” human nature became a key 
project for modernists. Ironically, this means that the confluence of Freudian and Marxist 
thought set modernism on its dangerous course. 
Interwar modernism was far more coherent epistemologically. It was unabashed about its 
positive relationship with modernization, from Le Corbusier’s definition of a house as a 
“machine for living” to socialist realism’s celebration of industrial and agricultural improvement. 
Nevertheless, returning to these roots was untenable thanks to the catastrophic reputation of 
interwar ideologies. It is fitting, then, that what replaced modernism—postmodernism—
continued to define itself according to its immediate predecessor’s epistemology, tethered to the 
ethnology of primitivity even though “primitivity” as it had hitherto been defined no longer 
existed. One of the many definitions of postmodernism which Fredric Jameson offers in 
Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism therefore describes the movement as 
“what you have when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good,” as 
opposed to modernism, in which “some residual zones of ‘nature’ or ‘being,’ of the old, the 
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older, the archaic, still subsist; culture can still do something to that nature and work at 
transforming that ‘referent.’”180 While Jameson is certainly correct that modernization 
precipitated the rise of postmodernism, his definition ignores how modernism defined itself prior 
to the Second World War, that is, as a call for aesthetic renewal in response to the consequences 
of modernization (i.e. material advancement and, in the Marxian view, class conflict) rather than 
as process of discovering human nature, a modernism which was ironically both allied and 
hostile to modernization. 
Modernism’s increasingly contradictory epistemology was hard to ignore. Even Reyner 
Banham recognized this state of affairs as early as 1955, when he published his first description 
of “The New Brutalism” for The Architectural Review. In it, he notes the movement’s mounting 
consciousness of its own metahistorical role. 
“Introduce an observer into any field of forces, influences or communications and that 
field becomes distorted. It is common opinion that Das Kapital has played old harry with 
capitalism, so that Marxists can hardly recognise it when they see it, and the widespread 
diffusion of Freud’s ideas has wrought such havoc with clinical psychology that any 
intelligent patient can make a nervous wreck of his analyst.”181 
The result, in the short term at least, was an earnest attempt to make sense of art history as a 
progressive process, hence Banham’s commitment to high modernism in architecture, 
specifically. However, as he suggests, this same awareness poses a considerable threat to 
modernism because it incentivizes the simulation of the values which comprise its epistemology. 
As Baudrillard notes in Simulacra and Simulation, “To simulate is to feign to have what one 
doesn’t have…But it is more complicated than that because simulating is not 
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pretending…pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the principle of reality intact…whereas 
simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false,’ the ‘real’ and the 
‘imaginary.’”182 By placing greater emphasis on the epistemological power of human “nature,” 
postwar modernism’s theoreticians created demand for idealized primitivity despite the growing 
sense that primitivity was moribund. Something had to give. But what? Shifting the goalposts on 
what constituted “authenticity” became a tempting way out. Neither primitivity nor modernity 
would have to be sacrificed. 
According to Baudrillard, the West’s mid-century change of heart was merely the final 
step in a longer process of demystification originating in debates about the power and place of 
images in religion. In various religious traditions (including Christianity and Islam) there have 
been periods of intense conflict over the practice of depicting divinity through the production of 
icons, that is, artificial images that serve as the object of veneration. Iconoclasts, the group that 
rejected the use of iconography, feared images of divinity because, in their view, “the visible 
machinery of icons substituted for the pure and intelligible Idea of God…[thereby suggesting] 
that deep down God never existed, that only the simulacrum ever existed.”183 Traditionally, 
iconoclasm has been viewed as a defense of a “Platonic Idea of God”184 which cannot be 
conveyed through artificial objects. Baudrillard, however, rejects this interpretation of 
iconoclasm. Instead, he argues that iconoclasts’ “metaphysical despair came from the idea that 
the image didn’t conceal anything at all.”185  They recognized that, at some point, the simulacra 
of divinity could replace actual faith in God among believers. 
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Simulacra, however, were not just a theological problem. Baudrillard believed that the 
gradual replacement of reality with its facsimile—a process which he termed the “precession of 
simulacra”—could explain the generalized retreat from notions of objective value, including in 
aesthetics. In his understanding, the precession is composed of four phases, each one expressing 
a different relationship between reality and the simulacra that reference it. In the first phase, 
when “it [the simulacrum] is the reflection of a profound reality,”186 there is an earnest desire to 
demonstrate what is true; for example, iconolaters’ genuine insistence that icons aid in worship. 
In the second, when “it masks and denatures a profound reality,” there exists a type of simulacra 
that improperly and thus detrimentally convey a truth—the kind of idolatry which iconoclasts 
were supposedly concerned with. The third phase, in which “it masks the absence of a profound 
reality,” refers to the image which is consciously misleading. Greenberg, for instance, detested 
Kitsch because he resented the profit-driven fakeness which it represented. In the final phase, 
however, in which “it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum,” 
authenticity-based critiques no longer make sense. Truth is not denied, per se, but merely suffers 
from irrelevance. By rhetorically positioning themselves in opposition to art (and thus “culture” 
as a whole), art brut, Brutalism, and abstract expressionism had attempted to peel back the layers 
of simulacra, believing in and attempting to prove a profound reality. Greenberg had defended 
high and low art against Kitsch on the grounds that they were unconcerned with the market and 
therefore possessed epistemological value. Now, after the perceived consolidation of the class 
system, all aesthetic output could reasonably be accused of being Kitsch—that is, oriented 
towards exchange- rather than use-value. In a world composed entirely of Kitsch, anything 
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before the final step of the precession of simulacra must be viewed agnostically. If discussions of 
religion initiated the precession, discussions of capital ended it. 
What remains of human nature when it can be viewed only as its own simulacrum? Only 
that which is visible can be evaluated. Agency, framed in terms of stated desire, becomes the 
final, acceptable realm of inquiry into the human condition. In terms of aesthetics, the only 
definition of “good” becomes “what people think is good,” because implying otherwise would 
insinuate a knowledge of some “profound reality” behind the image. “The real… no longer needs 
to be rational,” Baudrillard explains, “because it no longer measures itself against either an ideal 
or negative instance.” In terms of postwar modernism, that “ideal or negative instance” referred 
to the ideal primitive as a model for human nature. Human behavior, lacking depth, “is no longer 
anything but operational,”187 meaning that what is best for others can only be deduced from what 
they state outright—their preferences. This agnosticism regarding human “nature” reveals a 
second, more ideological reason that that the postmodern era did not see a reembrace of interwar 
communism: the deep connection which Marxism posits between the worker and the product of 
his or her labor. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx decries the fact 
that, under capitalism, “the object which labor produces—labor’s product—confronts it as 
something alien, as a power independent of the producer.”188 Marx considered the feeling of 
alienation to be an essential contradiction embedded within capitalist societies. Under the 
postmodern conception of the self, however, Marxian alienation appears unworkable because it 
conceives of a human nature beyond the operational. How can the capitalist alienate one’s labor 
when there is no self to be alienated from? 
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The eventual result of such an agnosticism is that every individual becomes an authority 
on human behavior. Who are you, postmodernism asks, to deny the stated wants of others when 
human nature is fundamentally unknowable? Fredric Jameson recognizes in Postmodernism that 
a hallmark of the postmodern is “the effacement…of the older (essentially high-modernist) 
frontier between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture,” a process which 
manifests “as a kind of aesthetic populism.”189 The source of this populism thus lies at the end of 
the precession of simulacra.  
Aesthetic populism, marginalized since the interwar period, sprung back with the 
postmodern, hence its parallels with Karl-Marx-Allee’s völkisch-cum-Stalinist sensibilities. As 
architectural critic Ross Wolfe has noted, the political demands of Stalinism “allowed traits that 
would later become associated with postmodernism to appear in the USSR before surfacing in 
the West.”190 A calculated appeal to popular taste was a key factor in both contexts. 
 
Theory in Action: Las Vegas and Los Angeles 
The implosion of postwar modernism under the weight of its own contradictions was 
astonishingly rapid. In 1966, Reyner Banham published The New Brutalism: Ethic or Aesthetic?, 
a brief history of Brutalism which also functioned as a postmortem for the movement. That same 
year, Robert Venturi (1925-2018), an up-and-coming American architect, released Complexity 
and Contradiction in Architecture, “A Gentle Manifesto” that denounced “the puritanically 
moral language of orthodox Modern architecture.”191 Whereas Banham spoke in terms of 
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architecture taking an “ethical stand,”192 Venturi begins Complexity and Contradiction with a 
series of “I like…” statements, such as “I like complexity and contradiction in architecture,” and 
“I do not like the incoherence or arbitrariness of incompetent architecture nor the precious 
intricacies of picturesqueness or expressionism,”193 thereby framing his manifesto in terms of 
personal preference rather than a transcendental aesthetic “good.” The parallel but opposite 
language of both Banham and Venturi’s manifestos—specifically regarding their treatment of 
“image”—reflects Brutalism’s position as both a final expression of high modernism and a 
vehicle of things to come. 
The precepts of Venturi’s manifesto bear the inklings of a postmodern ethos which came 
to dominate American architecture in the following decades. He advocates for maximalism 
(“More is not less”194), subjectivity (“I welcome the problems and exploit the uncertainties”195), 
and the examples which embellish his arguments remain unmoored from any one era, region, or 
school. Throughout the manifesto, however, Venturi issues indirect criticisms against the 
modernist movement. He describes the book as “an explanation, indirectly, of my work,”196 but 
couches scathing critiques of modernism in the language of unjudgmental self-justification. 
Venturi accuses “Orthodox Modern architects” of appreciating “complexity insufficiently or 
inconsistently,” and emphasizing “the primitive and elementary at the expense of the diverse and 
the sophisticated.”197 Venturi’s most incisive critique of the postwar aesthetic, however, was the 
concept of “image” as articulated by Reyner Banham and the Brutalists. 
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According to Reyner Banham, Brutalist buildings often employ raw concrete, exposed 
utilities, and disjointed floorplans because these practices contribute “to the building as ‘an 
image.’”198 The Smithsons and other Brutalist architects believed that “The building should be an 
immediately apprehensible visual entity; and that the form grasped by the eye should be 
confirmed by experience of the building in use.” Ideally, one could to look at the exterior of a 
building and know exactly how to navigate its interior. Although Banham notes that this 
approach sometimes resulted in structures which could not be considered beautiful “by the 
standards of classical aesthetics,”199 “image” speaks to the postwar modernists’ insistence on 
authenticity as its own value. Venturi, however, posits that the height of aesthetic value—
complexity and contradiction—“results from the juxtaposition of what an image is and what it 
seems.”200 By coopting the language of “image,” Venturi subtly subverts Brutalism’s moral 
vocabulary. Instead of being able to know the interior of a building from its exterior, Venturi’s 
use of “image” allows buildings to distort and equivocate such that “its space and its elements 
become readable and workable in several ways at once.”201 By subverting the expectations of 
physical space, Venturi also repudiates Greenberg’s insistence that good art should reveal the 
essential aspects of its own medium. Even architecture with its palpable physicality thus became 
a discipline of simulacra. 
Venturi’s interest in disentangling the connection between image and space led him to 
seek inspiration far outside the architectural mainstream. In the years following the publication 
of Complexity and Contradiction, he and his wife, the fellow architect Denise Scott Brown 
(1931-), began studying the behemoth casinos and hotels of the Las Vegas Strip. In 1972, the 
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couple (joined by Steven Izenour) condensed their findings into a book which they titled 
Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form. The choice of Las 
Vegas, as opposed to any other American boomtown, was deliberate. Las Vegas was Sin City. 
Whereas postwar aesthetics (including Brutalism) had been obsessed with the notion of morality, 
Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour make a point of declaring that “Las Vegas’s values are not 
questioned here.”202 Consequently, the group evaluated the city’s “architecture of persuasion”203 
without criticizing its content. The avant-gardes of the interwar had resisted capitalism and 
Clement Greenberg begrudgingly tolerated it, but Venturi and Scott Brown’s group embraced it 
wholeheartedly. 
The most important theoretical idea posited by Learning from Las Vegas was a proposed 
dichotomy between two categories of structures which “emphasize image…and that these 
symbolic and representational elements may often be contradictory to the form, structure, and 
program with which they combine in the same building.”204 The first archetype, the “duck,” 
named after a duck-shaped drive-in located in suburban Long Island (Fig. 5),205 describes “the 
special building that is a symbol.”206 Ostensibly, the “duck” possesses a certain similarity with 
the Brutalist conception of “image”—it communicates implicitly. Nevertheless, the symbol 
which composes its exterior fails to correspond with its interior. The group alleges that the model 
of the “duck” actually “pervades Modern architecture”207 despite the Brutalist distaste for 
superficiality. “The decorated shed,” on the other hand, “applies symbols”208 in order to 
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communicate, or in Las Vegas’s case, persuade. The Golden Nugget, situated on Fremont Street 
in Downtown Las Vegas (Fig. 6),209 exemplifies this latter category with its massive billboard 
and neon sidings diverting attention from what is, fundamentally, a low-slung, rectangular 
warehouse. Its fundamental form can fulfill the Brutalist idea of “image” (that is, the warehouse) 
but its mode of communication is explicit. In comparing the “duck” and the “decorated shed,” 
the group vows to “maintain that both kinds of architecture are valid,”210 thus promoting 
Venturi’s new, postmodern concept of “image” and placing the two archetypes on the same 
level. 
The project was framed as a populist endeavor. The students who aided the authors 
dubbed the project “The Great Proletarian Cultural Locomotive,”211 and their approach is 
introduced as a “positive, non-chip-on-the-shoulder view” of contemporary architecture.212 As in 
Complexity and Contradiction, Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour nonchalantly criticize the 
establishment for being out of touch and “dissatisfied with existing conditions,”213 a state of 
affairs which they attribute to modernism’s “progressive, if not revolutionary, utopian, and 
purist” style. The populism argument, with its visibly political implications, took the world of 
architectural criticism by storm.  
But what was the connection between populism and explicit communication as embodied 
by Venturi’s concept of image? The answer lies in the shifting perspectives on the validity of 
mass taste. Greenberg, for example, was both elitist and radical—he was (at least initially) 
politically committed to the idea of workers’ liberation but passionately defended high culture 
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against the exact type of aesthetic product which was most popular among the working classes 
(Kitsch). Through Kitsch, he argued, capitalism warped humanity’s natural aesthetic 
sensibilities, instilling in them a false consciousness of what is good and bad art. He privileged, 
therefore, the implicit interests of the modern working classes above the ones that they 
themselves articulated, a stance which echoes the Freudian idea of subconscious needs. Venturi, 
on the other hand, doubted that a cultural élite could somehow know the aesthetic interests of the 
working classes. As Complexity and Contradiction demonstrates, he even doubted the existence 
of an aesthetic interest beyond that which could be explicitly communicated through a series of 
likes and dislikes. A focus on the explicit communication of aesthetic taste, therefore, represents 
a reaction to the elitism of the postwar era and an attempt to validate working class taste on the 
class’s own terms—that is, in a populist manner. Ironically, Venturi’s celebration of popular 
taste belies his own persona as an architect—Complexity and Contradiction is filled with 
references to renaissance cathedrals and modernist villas, allusions which would only resonate 
with those who are deeply submerged in high culture. 
Even Reyner Banham was won over. The Norwich-born writer who had once celebrated 
Brutalism as Britain’s “first native art-movement since the New Art-History arrived here”214 
decamped to sunny Los Angeles where he, taking a note from Venturi and Scott Brown, “learned 
to drive in order to read Los Angeles in the original.”215 A mere five years after he declared 
Brutalism’s demise, Banham resurfaced with an enthusiastic defense of the car-centric 
metropolis entitled Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies. The tone which Banham 
adopted was one of awed detachment, like an explorer discovering an uncontacted people, 
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reflecting the reimagination of ethnology (or “antiethnology”) for the postmodern era. According 
to Banham, Los Angeles consisted of four coexisting “ecologies” or modes of urban existence. 
The first, “Surfurbia,” consisted of the chain of predominantly white and upper-middle-class 
oceanside communities stretching from Malibu to Orange County. Further inland lay the 
“Foothills,” the expensive romping grounds of the rich and famous. Between these “ecologies” 
stretched “The Plains of Id,” “an endless plain endlessly gridded with endless streets, peppered 
endlessly with ticky-tacky houses clustered in indistinguishable neighborhoods.”216 Finally, 
Banham identified the city’s substitute for public space: “Autopia,” the network of freeways 
which crisscrossed the region. 
The “Savage fiction” which Baudrillard lamented runs deep in The Architecture of Four 
Ecologies. Banham meticulously dissects architectural landmarks from the narrow strip of 
bourgeois settlement encircling the Los Angeles Basin, but disparagingly labels the proletarian 
core of the city itself “The Plains of Id,” even though the vast majority of Angelenos reside in 
this zone. He defamiliarizes ordinary life in California, depicting Angelenos as a race of 
innocents “Deeply imbued with the standard myths of the Natural Man and the Noble 
Savage…this innocence grows and flourishes as an assumed right in the Southern California sun, 
an ingenious and technically proficient cult of private and harmless gratifications.217 The positive 
connotations of primitivity, therefore, are carried over from late modernism, but the archetypal 
“primitive” has been relocated. No longer must we trek through jungles and mountains to meet 
the noble savage—he now lives in a comfortable single-family home in suburban Los Angeles. 
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Ecologies and politics 
 I want therefore I am. Postmodernism’s radical doubt of implicit truth required that 
preferences be taken at face value. “Good” taste could no longer be framed in terms of what 
people should like—their “rational” aesthetic interest—but rather in terms of what people state 
they like. Here, the connection between populism and the postmodern becomes clear; populism 
derives its precepts from explicit popular demands rather than implicit popular interest. In 
Learning from Las Vegas, Venturi’s group celebrates the Strip because it is an “antispacial” 
space in which “communication dominates space as an element in the architecture and in the 
landscape”218—“The Strip is virtually all signs.”219 A particularly illustrative image featured in 
the book is a doodle entitled “Recommendation for a monument” depicting a brick-shaped 
building supporting a gigantic billboard displaying the words “I AM A MONUMENT.” (Fig. 
7)220 Lines radiate from the billboard like a halo, suggesting the triumph of explicit 
communication over implicit form. 
Even animals, Baudrillard explains, are “made to speak”221 because “in a world 
assembled under the hegemony of signs and discourse, their silence weighs more and more 
heavily on our organization of meaning.”222 Their speech, and therefore agency, is simulated 
through the application of “the ‘psy’ language,”223 that is, a pseudo-psychiatry which can tap into 
an interpretable unconscious. “The Unconscious,” Baudrillard argues, “is this logistical 
mechanism that permits us to think madness (and more generally all strange and anomalous 
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formations) in a system of meaning opened to nonmeaning.”224 While the postmodern remains 
agnostic with regards to animal consciousness, it believes that the unconscious can provide a 
reasonable substitute. Baudrillard points out that obsessive or self-injuring behaviors among farm 
animals therefore constitute “communication” of a certain sort, for more space, food, or any 
other basic need. In a worldview defined by communication of self-interest, the inheritance of 
Freud proved useful for the “rationalization” of non-human nature. 
Why, then, did Banham refer to his urban archetypes of Los Angeles sprawl as 
“ecologies”? He mentions the natural world sparingly, mostly as a geographical prelude to his 
architectural observations. “Ecology” had become a metaphor for a certain type of “natural” 
environment, whether or not it referred to non-human nature. Based on Banham’s description of 
Los Angeles, he seems to frame “human ecologies”225 as homeostatic spaces circumscribed by 
geography but directed almost entirely by individual consumption. The ecological metaphor now 
signified a logic of rational self-interest resulting in equilibrium, mirroring and justifying the 
logic of capitalism. 
What did this mean for the political implications of the postmodern self? Generally 
speaking, populism flourished, but not all populist movements benefitted. In much of the West, 
the populist Left entered into a period of protracted decline marked by the privatization of 
national assets, the weakening of welfare states, and the demise of organized labor. Appeals to 
class interest proved less effective as the rhetoric of Marxian alienation waned. What remained 
of proletarian consciousness transformed into a strictly aesthetic populism. As Venturi and Scott 
Brown explain in Learning from Las Vegas, “One does not have to agree with hard-hat politics 
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to support the rights of the middle-middle class to their own architectural aesthetics.”226 The 
masses—now framed as “the middle-middle class” rather than the proletariat—possessed a right 
to aesthetics but not a right to the product of their own labor. If returning to interwar communism 
was impossible, what about the other interwar ideology, fascism? In “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin states that “Fascism attempts to organize the newly 
created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to 
eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance 
to express themselves.”227 The echoes of fascism are palpable, therefore, in Venturi’s insistence 
on a proletarian aesthetic consciousness that is separate from material class interest. 
“Hard-hat politics,” on the other hand, were framed as either utopian or unnatural. 
According to Venturi’s group, “Developers build for markets rather than for Man and probably 
do less harm than authoritarian architects would do if they had the developers’ power.”228 A 
product of Los Angeles’s “ecologies,” Ronald Reagan retained a populist veneer even as he 
pushed neoliberal reforms that intensified class stratification.229 As the “Great Communicator,” 
Reagan understood the centrality of communication in the postmodern “ecological” conception 
of human relations. As Margaret Thatcher forced industrial Britain into period of economic 
freefall, she often claimed that “There is no alternative.”230 Try as governments might, Thatcher 
believed that nature—that is, the free market—would always find a way to punish those who 
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meddle with it. As political scholar James W. Ceaser states, for the economic liberal element 
within the modern conservative movement, “the foundational concept is ‘spontaneous order,’ the 
postulate that there is a tendency operative in human affairs, and most likely in the whole 
cosmos, for things to work out for themselves and to cohere, provided no deliberate effort is 
made to impose an overall order.”231 He quotes Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), the Austrian 
doyen of classical liberal economics and a favorite of Thatcher,232 who equates the development 
of morality to “a process of cultural selection, analogous to a process of biological selection.”233 
This brand of pseudo-ecological thinking arose in tributes like Los Angeles: The Architecture of 
Four Ecologies but later came to define a whole generation of right-wing thought which, 
ironically, tended to emphasize the incorrigible and natural beauty of the free market at the 
expense of non-human nature.  
In his book Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, British cultural critic Mark 
Fisher (1968-2017) notes that “Capitalism seamlessly occupies the horizon of the thinkable.”234 
It is an ideology which appears so natural that it does not even need to justify itself as “good”—it 
just needs to convince the public that “Lowering our expectations…is a small price to pay for 
being protected from terror and totalitarianism.”235 Postmodern capitalism, which Fisher terms 
“capitalist realism,” justifies its existence in the same way St. Augustine might have justified the 
existence of earthquakes or plagues: as morally neutral symptoms of an incorrigible nature. 
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CONCLUSION 
 As Le Corbusier declares in Towards a New Architecture, “We do not appreciate 
sufficiently the deep chasm between our own epoch and earlier periods.”236 Never before in 
history, he points out, have individuals been able to witness so much material and thus social 
transformation within their own lifetimes. Like a horse, modernization can spook the “human 
animal,” leading to the kneejerk rejection of all changes presented, be they negative or positive. 
As a solution to this problem, Le Corbusier draws from his equine metaphor, suggesting that 
what humanity needs is a new harness—a new aesthetic—which will usher civilization through 
its modernizing journey. “When this human animal has put on his new harness,” the Swiss 
architect reasons, “he will see that things have changed: and changed for the better.”237 
Nevertheless, the journey at hand turned out to be more treacherous than Le Corbusier 
could have imagined when drafting his manifesto in the 1920s. While the First World War 
crushed the power of the aristocracy, allowing bourgeois and proletarian ideologies to finally 
dominate European seats of power, the Second World War revealed an extreme brutality which 
appeared to implicate modern society at every level, causing many Marxist thinkers to reevaluate 
their faith in the proletariat as a redemptive class. They sought refuge from the political by 
fleeing to the psychological. Modernity still promised great things, the new generation of left-
wing intellectuals argued, it was just that the masses were maladapted by a temporarily ill 
society. By observing “primitive” individuals and societies, it was hoped that human nature was 
not irredeemable. 
 But why did the West need primitivity to restore their faith? And why did the anxiety of 
postwar modernity have to play out in the sphere of aesthetics? By reinventing the idea of 
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objectively good taste for the modern era, Clement Greenberg imagined aesthetic consumption 
as something akin to a diet. He implies that individuals have an “appetite” for art which must 
somehow be satiated. Unfortunately, the consumption of “bad” aesthetic objects—namely 
Kitsch—can lead to a whole host of unhealthy complications: exploitation, manipulation, and 
generalized cultural malaise. He looks around at Western societies and sees them awash in 
schlock. In some regions (like Germany or the Soviet Union) the populace has been so inundated 
that they have allowed manipulative totalitarian politics to take hold, thus engendering the 
catastrophes which faced modernism. 
 What, then, is a good dietician to do? The answer, at least to Greenberg, is clear: identify 
the essence of nutrition (good taste) and prescribe it to the masses, who will happily abandon the 
garbage on which they have hitherto been subsisting. Part of what made Greenberg’s aesthetic 
“diet” so promising, therefore, was that it promised a path by which modernist aesthetics could 
save itself. A science of aesthetics would have to lead the way, but since art cannot fit within the 
normal constraints of scientific methodology, society had to undertake a different sort of 
experiment, one of great magnitude which would be conducted over the course of decades. As in 
any experiment, there would need to be two groups for the sake of comparison. The first group 
consists of those who are drowning in Kitsch—the inhabitants of the West and other societies 
which have been highly modified by the pressures of capitalism. The second consists of those 
who are far less exposed to the unhealthy treatment of capital-infiltrated culture: the “primitive” 
peoples on the margins of the Western ecumene, including neurodivergent people, oppressed 
racial minorities, and inhabitants of colonized regions. By identifying the differences between 
the aesthetic diets of these two groups—one injurious and the other fortifying—the essence of 
aesthetic nutrition can be distilled into a medicine which would cure the West of its bad taste. 
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Cultural critics hailing from various spheres thus coalesced around primitivism as an 
epistemological tool. Herbert Marcuse, drawing upon Freudian theories on the relationship 
between civilization and the psyche, saw salvation in the free-wheeling eroticism of modernity. 
Clement Greenberg saw it in technology’s ability to separate aesthetic value from mere Kitsch. 
Reyner Banham saw it in the brutal realism of modern architecture. This “medicine,” with its 
anti-cultural pretensions, was undoubtedly bitter. The hulking concrete masses of Brutalism and 
the inscrutable paintings of Abstract Expressionism were hard to swallow. Nevertheless, 
modernism appeared to have been rescued (at least for the time being) from the distorting effects 
of the modernized, capitalist world from which it had emerged. The “modern world,” however, 
had other plans. Ulli Beier had sought redemption at the supposed margins of the world—only to 
see his refuge rapidly accede to the Western ecumene. Decolonization and the gradual reduction 
of de jure social iniquities triggered a reassessment of the peoples that had earlier been saddled 
with supposed primitivity. If they too had been subject to the same logic of capital which 
Greenberg had found so objectionable, the entire experiment would be rendered bunk. The 
aesthetic “diet” would have to be totally reimagined. 
 Lacking any grounds on which to determine which aesthetic objects are “healthy,” how 
does one go about determining what people should consume? Really, the only approach one has 
left is simply to give the people what they want. One must turn the apparatus of ethnology in on 
itself and study the unpretentious classes of one’s own country as “primitive” in their own 
right—more in touch with their basic reactions to art, less concerned with the judging eyes of 
high society. As it turns out, middle-class Americans or Europeans do not want bitter medicine—
they want candy. This is the ethos of Robert Venturi: the people want candy, so they deserve 
candy. And who’s to say there’s anything wrong with that? 
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The postmodern revolution was the tale of two generations’ attempts to deal with the 
question of brutality. The concept of “progress” had implied a dichotomy between brutality 
civilization, with modernity striving towards an ever more ethical state. The events of the 20th 
century proved this dichotomy false by showing a modernity that was as brutal, if not more 
brutal, than ever. Faced with the challenge of this realization, the postwar generation strove to 
salvage modernity by reclaiming the “brutal”—hence the creation of art brut and Brutalism. 
Inadvertently, however, their actions had the effect of raising brut to the height of fashion. To 
meet the demand for brutality, a new generation arose that did not concern itself with the 
supposedly distorting influences of the market. Indeed, this generation celebrated the market, 
seeing it as the consequence of humanity’s natural, brutal drive towards competition and 
communication. They rediscovered and celebrated pop culture with the detached fascination of 
an anthropologist. Like the generation before them, they were faced with an unprecedented 
challenge to the notion of progress in history. Instead of adapting modernism, however, they 
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Fig. 3. Reverse slide of Kenyatta International Conference Center, Nairobi. Photograph taken by 




Fig. 4. Stereograph cards depicting the Stalinallee (now Karl-Marx-Allee) in East Berlin, GDR. 
Published by VEB Rathenower Optische Werke, 1953. 
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